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STRESEMANN'S REAL POLITIK TO THE SIGNING
OF THE LOCARNO PEACE PACT

by

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PREFACE

Directing and planning recovery from the World War was the responsibility of a new Germany born of the Weimar Assembly. Defeated and demoralized, the young republic looked in vain for any solace or political guidance from the conquerors of imperial Germany. Treated by allied statesmen like the arrogant Germany of old, the Weimar Republic suffered one defeat after another at the international conferences held throughout Europe, and received its greatest humiliation as the French troops marched into the Ruhr. Out of the chaos of party conflicts within Germany, and French aggression from without, emerged Herr Dr. Gustav Stresemann to take over the reins of government, and to give the republic for the first time a true course of direction.

This study proposes to review Stresemann's career before becoming foreign minister, to note his efforts to gain confidence abroad, to examine his policy in dealing with the western powers, and to see by what means he won the political support at home necessary to carry on that policy. Above all, it is hoped that this study will throw some light upon the real motives behind the foreign policy pursued.

The author of this research wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. Wren for his assistance and encouragement and to the University library staff for their aid in securing much of the material.

CHAPTER I

STRESEMANN COMES INTO POWER

The German Reich established under the Weimar constitution had an exceedingly precarious foundation, opposed on the right by a vehement nationalist group that objected to any attempt at carrying out the treaty of Versailles, and on the left by a Communist faction that would favor an alliance or understanding with the Bolshevik. The early governments of Germany were formed from a coalition of the three moderate parties, the Democrats, the Centre, and the Social Democrats. On this government devolved the onerous task of carrying out the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly the unpopular reparations and disarmament clauses of the treaty. The government was given some confidence by the large majority of the people, particularly the working class, which supported a general strike to make ineffective the attempted "putsch" by Herr Kapp.

The important factor dominating German policy, foreign and domestic, was the reparations problem. Within it were included the distinct questions of inter-Allied debts, French security, disarmament of the Reich, and the economic reconstruction of all countries which had suffered

¹
 during the war. In an effort to find some solution of this problem acceptable to Germany, successive German governments fell before continuing crises. A series of conferences throughout Europe followed in quick succession in the hope of finding some solution to the problem.

The plan presented to the German experts at the London Conference in 1921 was found unacceptable. The German experts, headed by Dr. Simons, asked for a reduction of the Allied figure of £11,300,000,000 to £1,500,000,000, and declared that even this figure exceeded Germany's capacity to pay. The German counter-proposal further suggested that Allied troops of occupation be withdrawn as soon as Germany paid the fixed sum, and that the whole settlement be contingent on Germany's retention of upper Silesia.² The Allies considered the German counter-proposal out of the question, and presented their original proposal in the form of an ultimatum which Germany must accept or take the consequences of the rejection. On rejection of the ultimatum by the Reichstag the Fehrenbach cabinet resigned. The new government, headed by Dr. Wirth, pledged itself to the policy of fulfillment of the Allied

1. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1921 (Oxford, 1927), p. 115. Asked in April, 1924, what were republican Germany's chief anxieties and problems, Chancellor Wilhelm Marx replied: "All center in the reparations question. . . . This question is pregnant with life or death for Germany." Edward Price Bell, Germany's Hope for Peace (Chicago Daily News Reprints) (Chicago, 1924), p. 5.

2. R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925, (New York, 1927), pp. 211-14; Toynbee, pp. 130-31.

ultimatum. Payments were started and for a time maintained, but with the adverse decision of the Allies in the autumn of 1921 on the matter of upper Silesia,³ the Wirth cabinet resigned. A new cabinet was organized again under Wirth. By December, 1921, the Germans announced their inability to make payments falling due in January and February, and asked for a moratorium, which was granted at the Cannes conference. At this stage the French government seemed favorable toward an understanding with Germany, but the French ministry under Briand gave way to Poincare.

The continued unsettlement of the Reparation Problem contributed to the collapse of the German currency. By the end of April, 1923, the mark had depreciated to 140,000 to the pound.⁴ Inability of the Wirth ministry to sustain the mark led to a second resignation. President Ebert now decided to set aside all party consideration and formed a business-man's cabinet headed by Dr. Wilhelm Cuno. Cuno's primary concern on accession to power was to obtain a final and fair estimate of Germany's capacity to pay. Raymond Poincare, already pledged to

3. William S. Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, (New York: 1946) p. 206.

4. R. B. Mowat, p. 247.

a policy of force, refused to make concessions. He insisted that Germany had the capacity, but lacked the will to pay. There would be no moratorium without productive guarantee, and the productive guarantee demanded was the Ruhr area. Despite objections by England and America, Poincare decided to act. On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian troops under the command of General Degoutte moved into the Ruhr.⁵

The German parties, with the exception of the Nationalists who called for active resistance, and the Communists who urged a general strike, united solidly behind Cuno's policy of passive resistance toward the French. The program of passive resistance, though reducing coal shipments to France to a trickle, proved to be too great a drain on the already weakened German currency. The attempt of the government to finance the resistance through printing of additional currency sent the exchange rate on the mark into astronomical figures.⁶ The result was chaotic inflation, and a virtual destruction of the German middle class. All efforts to find some solution failed dismally,

5. Halperin, pp. 247-8. For Poincare's insistence that Germany possessed the capacity but not the will to pay reparations, see Edward Price Bell, Steadfast France (Chicago Daily News Reprints), (Chicago, 1924), pp. 5-6.

6. H. G. Daniels, The Rise of the German Republic, (London: 1927) pp. 206-210.

since Poincare refused to listen to any German proposal that did not first end passive resistance, while the Germans asked first for some guarantees of French withdrawal from the Ruhr before giving up resistance. With the collapse of the German economy, strong party opposition to Cuno's ministry arose. The opposition was led by Wilhelm Marx, the Centrist spokesman, and Gustav Stresemann, leader of the People's Party. When the Social Democrats finally demanded a stronger government Cuno handed in his resignation. On August 12, 1923, Ebert requested Stresemann to form a new government.⁷

7. For full discussion of above period see also:

Lee F. Benna, Europe Since 1914 (New York: 1930)

R. T. Clark, The Fall of the German Republic,
(London: 1935)

H. G. Daniels, The Rise of the German Republic,
(London: 1935)

Kuno Francke, German After-War Problems (Cambridge, 1927), especially pp. 31-33, 95-102 and 127-28.

Veit Valentin, The German People (New York: 1946)

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND ON STRESEMAN

In order the better to understand the real accomplishments of the man Stresemann, who took over the reins of German government at a time when the industrial Ruhr was occupied by a French army, the Rhineland policed by Allied troops, German economy crippled by the falling value of currency, and separatist movements growing in various parts of the Reich--the man who before his death raised his fatherland to a nation of first rank--it may be well briefly to review his early life. Such a review may contribute to an understanding of the real intent of his foreign policy.

Born on May 19, 1878, the son of a retailer of bottled beer, Stresemann came from the heart of the Berlin lower middle class. He graduated from the University of Berlin, specializing in the field of political economy. On graduation he accepted a position with the Association of German Chocolate Manufacturers in Dresden. In his early youth he had seen his father's retail trade crushed by the big cartels. Now as an assistant manager he began organizing the small business men throughout Saxony, with the intent of breaking up the sugar cartel on which the chocolate industry was dependent. Within ten years he

had created an organization of five thousand members, From Saxony his movement spread to other German states, and Stresemann was recognized as a founder of a new type¹ of German business organization.

His interests in business organization soon led him into politics. He felt that industry needed some force to counteract the influence of agriculture in government. He cast his lot with the National Liberal party under Basserman, and at the age of twenty-seven he was elected to the Reichstag. Stresemann immediately began to champion an expanded naval program and the acquisition of colonies. He sponsored an idea for a "German Company for World Trade,"² a project which was shelved upon the outbreak of the war.

During the war Stresemann became one of the foremost expansionists in the Reichstag. He vigorously attacked what he termed the weak leadership of Bethmann-Hollweg, and accepted as absolute any information from the General staff. To support his views he would quote others: "Capelle told me . . ." or "I heard from an authoritative source."³ Stresemann welcomed U-boat warfare because it made war

1. Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers, Vol. 1 (New York: 1935) pp. 11-12.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

3. Antonine Vallentin, Stresemann (New York: 1931) p. 37.

with America inevitable. ⁴ As an expansionist he constantly referred to Frederick II: "a war that does not lead to annexations is a war wasted." His expansionist aims urged a wide extension of agricultural lands in the east, territory that would produce minerals and coal, and the coast of Flanders, control of Belgium and Poland, and colonial possessions, and he insisted upon war indemnity. "If we could conclude a dictated peace, no one of our party would protest if we did snatch a bit of foreign territory because it was contrary to an agreement among nations." ⁵ So thoroughly was he convinced of ultimate German victory, that when Prince Max of Baden called together the party leaders to read an announcement from the Supreme Command that Germany must give up the war as hopeless, witnesses reported that Stressemann "looked as if he had been struck." Even then Stressemann refused to accept the facts until he was shown a memorandum signed by Ludendorff. ⁶

4. Count Bernstorff, The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff. (London: 1936) (Translated by Eric Sutton) p. 249. In conversation with Bernstorff, Stressemann admitted that he would never have supported the U-boat warfare if he had not believed the Navy when they claimed that the Americans could not get across.

5. Philip Scheidemann, Memoirs of a Social Democrat. (London: 1929) (Translated by J. E. Mitchell) I, pp. 220-8.

6. Prince Max of Baden, The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden. (New York: 1928) (Translated by W. M. Calder and G. W. H. Sutton) II, p. 11.

Following the armistice Stresemann succeeded in uniting what remained of the National Liberal Party with the Progressive People's Party to form the German People's Party of which he became the leader. By 1919 he had regained much of his post-war optimism. "There was never a greater prospect," he said, "of pursuing a well considered German policy and laying the foundations for our future position in Europe than at present."⁷ Slowly and steadily he began to develop his "real politik." As a member of the Reichstag and a party leader, he voted against the Weimar Constitution, and also against the signing of the peace treaty. He criticized Dr. Simons at the London Conference for having made the mistake of making the reparations payments appear small to please the German public instead of large to please the allies. His vote against accepting the London ultimatum and Wirth's policy of fulfillment was his last negative vote. From then on, until his death, Stresemann and the German People's Party associated themselves with, rather than against the established government.⁸

With the formation of the Cuno Cabinet, two cabinet posts were granted to the German People's Party. Strese-

7. Stresemann, I, p. 21

8. Vallentin, Stresemann, pp. 55-6.

mann was omitted from the cabinet because, Stresemann believed, President Ebert feared that the People's Party might become too influential. As for the Chancellor personally, Stresemann deplored his lack of strength and did not wish to be associated too closely with him.⁹ Stresemann urged upon the foreign minister that he get in touch with France immediately to avoid the inevitable invasion of the Ruhr. He also approved Cuno's proposal of a "Rhine pact" as a sort of guarantee of the present frontiers, but was sceptical of the success of such a policy. Stresemann was convinced that "France did not want the Rhinegold--she wanted the Rhine."¹⁰

In a speech in the Reichstag on March 6, 1923, Stresemann accused the French of attempting to establish a political and economic hegemony of Europe, and charged that in invading the Ruhr France was not interested in reparations, but in the severance of German territory. The occupation of the Ruhr would result in great economic losses for both Germany and France. He recommended for Germany support for Cuno's policy of passive resistance. "What we must do is to force France, by our unanimous resistance, to abandon her opposition to international negotiations on the

9. Stresemann, I, p. 27.

10. Ibid., p. 29.

reparations questions."¹¹

Cuno's whole policy of opposition to the French occupation was based upon passive resistance. Stresemann agreed that passive resistance could not be abandoned until a reparations agreement was reached and French troops were withdrawn.¹² He accepted passive resistance, however, not with the stubborn nationalism of Cuno but as a means of bringing about a settlement of the reparations question without the loss of German soil to France. It was of absolute importance to establish and maintain contact with Paris. In a letter to Dr. Jänecke, editor of the Manöver Courier, Stresemann criticized Cuno for the government's failure to do so. "Before the occupation of the Ruhr," he wrote, "the Cuno Cabinet could well have got into touch with France, and in my opinion should have done so, as the decisive political centre is in Paris."¹³

11. Ibid., p. 47.

12. Viscount D'Abernon, The Diary of an Ambassador, (New York: 1929) II, p. 170.

13. Stresemann, I, pp. 75-6.

CHAPTER III

THE HUNDRED DAYS AS CHANCELLOR

On August 13, 1923, Dr. Gustav Stresemann formed his "great coalition" Cabinet which included representatives from all parties except the Nationalists on the extreme right and the Communists on the extreme left. The situation in Germany called for a strong man with courage to act. D'Abernon, the English ambassador in Berlin, regarded Stresemann as the ideal man for leadership. His bellicose war record gave him a position with the Nationalists. They might detest his measures, but they could not personally attack him with the same vehemence as a Socialist or Centrist minister.¹

Stresemann, in urging Cuno in a Reichstag speech to adopt a more active policy, had explained his "real politik" in this way. "What does an active policy mean? It means, ultimately, a readiness for every international situation so as to be able to use it to the advantage of Germany. But what advantage can we draw from the international situation in which we find ourselves? We can, at least, make the way clear for international agreements and provide a final solution of the reparation question, and thus obtain

¹ I. Viscount D'Abernon, "Stresemann," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Jan. 1930), p. 209.

the freedom of the Ruhr and the Rhineland."² As Chancellor now, he had the opportunity to carry out his ideas, and he considered himself qualified to do so. He once said: "Who-³ ever would play 'real politik' must have daring dreams."

On August 11, 1923, Lord Curzon, British foreign minister, dispatched a note to Belgium and France to the effect that "His Majesty's Government" did not view the occupation of the Ruhr with favor. Great Britain urged submitting this question to arbitration. She did not favor separate action, but admitted that a settlement could not be delayed much longer.⁴ This dispatch was quickly noticed on the continent. In Germany it gave the ruling class courage. Copies of the English note were printed and distributed among the German people. The note strengthened Stresemann's determination to put German finances right. In France the note also had a decided effect. There was talk now of the need for France and Germany to come to some reasonable agreement, and for German and French industry to cooperate or be overpowered

2. Vallentin, p. 94.

3. Emil Ludwig, "Stresemann," The Nation, Vol. 127, No. 3305, (Nov. 7, 1928), p. 474.

4. Walter Consuelo Langsam and James Michael, Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since 1918 (New York: 1939) pp. 141-3; Mowat, pp. 250-52.

by England.⁵

On August 14, Stresemann appeared before the Reichstag to present his cabinet and to announce his foreign policy. The work of the foreign ministry he took upon himself. He praised the German public for its support of passive resistance in the Ruhr. Referring to the English note of August 11, Stresemann insisted that the German people must not suppose that this would lead to an immediate settlement of the question of the Ruhr, but hinted that it would decidedly affect the course followed by the French and Belgian governments. The cabinet proposed that the justice or injustice of the Ruhr should be submitted to an international court of arbitration. He advised the Reichstag that the best policy Germany could follow was to settle its affairs at home. "He alone is lost who surrenders. We have the right to believe in Germany's future and we have the task of securing it."⁶ As to reparations in particular,⁷ Stresemann informed the members of the Reichstag:

If the free and unrestrained administration of the Ruhr is assured us; if the situation in the Rhineland again is such as is guaranteed by international treaties; if every imprisoned German in the Ruhr and Rhineland is restored to liberty, then after a breathing spell. . .

5. D'Abernon, II, p. 250.

6. Stresemann, I, pp. 89-90.

7. Literary Digest, Vol. 88, No. 9, (Sept. 1, 1923) p. 14.

we shall be able. . .to furnish means for settlement of the reparations questions, provided the burdens imposed upon us permit of the existence of our economic life.

Several days after his Reichstag speech, in a conversation with the British Ambassador, Stresemann expressed his approval of the English note of August 11. He also notified D'Abernon that there would be no change in the policy of passive resistance. The tone would be milder, and perhaps communication with Paris would be less interrupted, but under no conditions would communication be carried on exclusively with France. There was no intent on the part of Germany to break up the Entente. The countries concerned would have to arrive at a settlement together. Germany's first problem was to find some means to end the inflation.⁸

In a dispatch dated August 20, 1923, Poincaré answered Lord Curzon's note. He upheld the legality of French occupation. He partially allayed English fear that the French intended to remain in the Ruhr indefinitely, and insisted that they had no desire to annex any territory. "We know perfectly well that Germany can pay us what she owes us quite quickly, and that consequently she has it in her hands to secure progressive evacuation. The date at

8. D'Abernon, II, p. 253

which payments are made depends on Germany's will." As to Germany's capacity to pay, means for determining this were provided for in the Treaty of Versailles and there was no need of superseding the Reparations Commission. As to inter-Allied debts, France would renounce German reparations to the extent that her debts were forgiven her.⁹ This note was, however, in a much milder tone than other British-French correspondence since the Ruhr occupation.

A cabinet meeting on August 23 considered in detail Germany's position in foreign affairs. Stresemann stated that Germany's position was a little less desperate. Germany could expect no direct aid from England, but England was attempting to isolate France and bring in Italy and Belgium on her side and interest America in the solution of reparations. The matter of German entry into the League of Nations was not under consideration. There was grave danger that during the winter passive resistance might break down. The German people would have to be prepared to make concessions, but despite the desperate situation¹⁰ the sovereignty of the Reich would be maintained.

On the following evening Stresemann addressed the

9. "Full Text of Poincare's Reply to Great Britain's Note of August 11," Current History, Vol. 19, (Oct. 1923), pp. 61-71.

10. Stresemann, I, pp. 95-6.

German Trade and Industry Association celebrations. In the course of his address he referred to previous offers that had been made by the Cuno government toward a solution of the reparation question, and intimated further that Germany would be willing to offer a part of her industry as a productive pledge for the fulfillment of her reparations obligations. But as for the hypothecation of the Ruhr, the railways or individual mines in the Ruhr that could not be regarded as a solution. "The question of the German Rhineland is, for us, no question of compromise; for every German worthy of the name, and for every German party, only one aim: The German Rhine within a united German Reich."¹¹ The idea of bringing the German industrialists to the support of his program, and of offering productive guarantees to France was developed further in his Stuttgart speech of September 3. He suggested here the possibility of offering French industry a share of German industry, in the hope that out of such industrial agreements might be found a¹² solution to the reparation problem.

In order to aid his cabinet, which was applying itself to the task of settling the Ruhr conflict, Stresemann called on the French Ambassador, de Margerie, to discuss the matter with him. In the conversation de Margerie

11. Ibid., p. 96

12. Ibid., p. 109

stated that France was anxious to study the question, but he wished to emphasize that Poincaré had frequently insisted on the cessation of passive resistance prior to any official discussion. Stresemann said he was anxious to open the discussion, but conditions in Germany were such that no government could maintain itself which gave up passive resistance without obtaining some honorable understanding on the Ruhr conflict. Stresemann suggested that the English note of July 20¹³ might be used as a basis of understanding. De Margerie interrupted, asserting that the conflict in the Ruhr was a matter that concerned only France, Belgium, and Germany. Stresemann was anxious to know whether the existing French policy was unalterable, or whether there was a chance for an understanding on several questions. These were:

1. France wants productive pledges. Germany feels that productive pledges could be created by the hypothecation of industry and agriculture. Was there a possibility of agreement?
2. Could not French desire for coal and coke be met by interstate agreements, or private agreements guaranteed by the state?

13. Stresemann erred in giving the date of the note as June 10. He referred to Lord Guzon's note to the other Allied governments, emphasizing the necessity of ending passive resistance. The British government suggested that Germany's capacity to pay should be examined by competent and impartial experts. (See World Peace Foundation, Reparation, Part IV, "Proposal for Settlement," Vol. 6, No. 4, 1923. Pp. 268-271.) For a discussion on the interchange of notes between England and France over the Ruhr occupation see, Mowat, pp. 248-253.

3. Could not a closer relation between German and French industries lead to an economic agreement with France?
4. The question of deliveries in kind was one that needed settlement.

Stresemann was anxious, also, to know the French attitude on the Rhine pact proposed by the Cuno government. De Margerie said he did not know the views of the French government, but he felt that the Treaty of Versailles offered France enough safeguards. He added that he would inform the French¹⁴ premier of the discussion to ascertain his views.

On the following day Stresemann received the English Ambassador, D'Abernon, to discuss with him the July 20 note, and the decision of the German government to proceed on the basis of the note. He had been reluctant to do so, but the decision was necessary in the interests of Germany. What he hoped was that some English statesman would say that the basis of Stresemann's Stuttgart speech was similar to Lord Curzon's note of July 20, and that the two would offer an¹⁵ excellent ground for continued negotiations. The conversation of the previous day with de Margerie was discussed. He informed D'Abernon that, to de Margerie's statement that that Ruhr policy did not concern England, he had replied,

14. Stresemann, I, pp. 97-101

15. D'Abernon, II, p. 265.

"By your action in the Ruhr you make it impossible for Germany to pay reparations. Are not England's interests concerned?" If the French continued to insist that Germany give up passive resistance without giving her some assurances in return, only chaos and civil war would follow. Germany had no desire to make a settlement with France alone, but unless the English should take some action shortly Germany would be forced to do so.¹⁶

Stresemann was utilizing every available means to break down the barrier that existed between Germany and France. He felt that a more determined attitude on the part of England would alter Poincare's view of refusing to discuss the reparations problem without complete abandonment of passive resistance by Germany. He addressed the English public through the Berlin correspondent of the Daily Mirror. The solution to the reparation of war damage was possible only, he said, on the basis of common interests of the nations concerned. England wanted her share, and Germany was willing to pay. Yet, as long as Germany was deprived of the Ruhr, she was incapable of paying.¹⁷

16. Ibid., pp. 264-5.

17. Stresemann, I, p. 102.

D'Abernon concluded from a Belgian note on August 28 that that country was anxious for a solution, and that Belgium's attitude might soften Poincaré. Stresemann was willing to accept any solution that did not infringe on German territorial sovereignty. With the continuing decline of the mark (on September 7, it stood at two hundred and fifty million to a pound sterling), which was hastened by the government's efforts to finance passive resistance, it was a race between compromise and collapse.¹⁹

In a discussion with the foreign affairs committee of the Reichstag, Stresemann outlined the policy pursued in the past, and what the country had to face in the immediate future. The Cuno and Poincaré governments had been deadlocked, the one refusing to negotiate without abandon-

18. The Belgian note was dated August 27. In it, M. Jaspar, the Belgian Foreign Minister suggested that negotiations had proceeded to the state where friendly conversations between Allied ministers should take place, not in the form of a conference, however. The note represented an effort on the part of M. Jaspar to restore the entente between Great Britain and France.

For full discussion of the note see: Toynbee, 1924, pp. 358-9.

19. D'Abernon, II, p. 266.

Mr. Basil Miles of the American section of the International Chamber of Commerce at Paris reported: "The Ruhr has been termed the economic heart of Germany. That heart has now stopped beating, and it remains to be seen how long the body, namely the unoccupied part of Germany can remain animate without it." Literary Digest, Vol. 88, No. 9, (Sept. 1, 1925), p. 15.

ment of passive resistance. Some help had been expected²⁰ from England after the issue of the August 11 note. Since then the English attitude had been one of tacit consent and of urging Germany to give up passive resistance. "The immediate aim of German policy is the liberation of the Ruhr. The actual means of securing this end has been and still is the policy of passive resistance." He pointed out to the committee that the cost of maintaining passive resistance was such a burden that the government could not carry it much longer. In fact the economic situation was so acute that unless the government found a solution the collapse of the Reich was imminent. The change in situations had forced him to alter his entire policy. In his first Reichstag speech he stated that "order in home affairs would be the best foreign policy." Conditions in Germany were such that the domestic problem could be approached only through settlement of the foreign situation. The present aim of the government, without formally abandoning

20. An identic note on August 11 was addressed to France and Belgium. In it England charged that France and Belgium were demanding advantages in Germany at the expense of their Allies, particularly England. His Majesty's Government regarded the occupation of the Ruhr illegal.

For Text see: World Peace Foundation, Reparation, Part IV, "Proposals for Settlement," Vol. 6, No. 4, 1923. pp. 272-288.

passive resistance, was to offer material securities in German industry and an increased total payment.²¹

What hopes Stresemann may have had for coming to an agreement with France were dissipated by Poincare's speech of September 9, in which he declared that France preferred the positive pledges she then had to general pledges that Germany might give on paper. Stresemann confessed to D'Abernon that he could gain nothing by giving up passive resistance--not even a verbal promise.²²

It had become quite obvious to Stresemann and his cabinet that passive resistance in the Ruhr would have to be abandoned. The problem was: how could the abandonment be presented to the German public without precipitating a civil war in the Reich? There was a general threat of a Red uprising in Saxony, and an equally dangerous movement by Bavarian particularists to set up an independent state. The Bavarian Minister had indicated to Stresemann that capitulation to France would in many parts of Bavaria be

21. Stresemann, I, pp. 104-11.

Note: Stresemann was quoted in a newspaper interview August 28 as saying, "If my Government fails, accomplishing nothing, then I shall perhaps be the last civilian chancellor of Germany. It may be the end." Commenting on the food problem he added, "... although there are many million cans of frozen meat in Germany, we have not the money with which to buy it from the American owners."

"Events of a Month Throughout the World," Current History, Vol. 19, No. 1 (October 1923) p. 162.

22. D'Abernon, II, p. 267.

considered a dissolution of the Reich, a second Versailles. 23

Von Maltzen, German Secretary of State, upon being questioned by D'Abernon as to what England could do to avert the German crisis, suggested that in the forthcoming meeting between Baldwin and Poincare, the former might suggest that Germany be offered some relief in return for abandonment of resistance. If Poincare should show some inclination toward the proposal, then England could advise Germany in the friendliest manner to give up passive resistance, and at the same time offer some prospect of help. Such procedure could be used to great advantage in influencing German public opinion. The idea appealed to D'Abernon. On September 14 two members of Parliament arrived in Berlin and were received by the Chancellor. Their report to the London press stated that German industry was anxious to make sacrifices, but if within a week some statesmanship did not prevail it was impossible to predict the fate of Europe. 24

During a cabinet meeting on September 15 a Prussian representative urged that it would be better to abandon passive resistance rather than wait until it broke down of itself. Stresemann believed that the immediate abandonment of resistance would be a serious political error. He asked that the situation be continued for at least three more

23. Stresemann, I, p. 131

24. Ibid., p. 119.

days when the French premier and the English Prime Minister should meet. England might at this time inform the French government on what conditions German resistance might be given up.²⁵

In a communique issued September 19, in connection with the meeting of the prime ministers of England and France, Baldwin stated that "in no single question was there a difference of view as to the aims to be attained, nor any fundamental opposition that might endanger the cooperation between the two countries on which the stability and the peace of the world so largely depended."²⁶ But whatever hopes Stresemann still may have had were dimmed by the report from D'Abernon that the information he had from Paris indicated that nothing less than unconditional surrender would be acceptable.²⁷ This surely was the darkest moment in the history of the reparations problem.

No advantage was to be expected from further postponement of a decision regarding the fate of the occupied area. At noon on September 24, Chancellor Stresemann assembled his cabinet. The Chancellor explained that he had failed to induce the Allied powers to grant his demands--release of prisoners and re-establishment of German

25. *Ibid.*, p. 120

26. Toynbee, 1934, p. 339; Mowat, p. 262.

27. D'Abernon, p. 276.

sovereignty of the Ruhr before passive resistance was abandoned. Yet the financial burden of maintaining the resistance was more than the government could bear. He recommended abandonment of resistance. In the debates that followed, only the German National People's Party wanted passive resistance carried on with more vigor. The party recommended an open break with France. Stresemann expressed the view that passive resistance had been of great service; it had united the German people and made a great impression on the world. A large majority present supported the Chancellor's view. The idea of continuing passive resistance²⁸ was finally abandoned.

On the 26th of September, President Ebert issued an official proclamation explaining the change of policy by the government. Resistance for the past week had cost the government 3,500,000,000,000,000 marks. Continuation meant economic destruction for Germany. The president paid a fine tribute to the inhabitants of the Ruhr for their sacrifices.

"We shall never forget what was endured by those who went through this ordeal. We shall never forget the sacrifices of those who preferred to leave their homes rather than break faith with their Fatherland. The Government's principal task is now to secure the release of the prisoners and the return of the exiles. The struggle for these elementary human rights comes before any economic and material considerations."²⁹

28. Stresemann, I, pp. 131-3.

29. Associated Press dispatch of the official Proclamation, Literary Digest, Vol. 79, No. 1, (Oct. 6, 1923) p. 9.

The American press generally regarded the abandonment of resistance as a victory for Poincare, but paid tribute to the courage and wisdom of Stresemann. The German newspaper, Vossische Zeitung, spoke of the government's policy as "an exhibition of courage which had been sadly lacking at previous critical periods for Germany." The Boersen Courier referred to "September 24, 1923, as a day of mourning for the German people, but not a day of which they need to be ashamed."³⁰

In an interview with D'Abernon Stresemann explained his reason for abandoning passive resistance. The finances of the Reich made further resistance impractical, yet it had been difficult to abandon resistance in face of the opposition from Bavaria where a state of emergency had been declared.³¹

During a cabinet meeting on October 8, Count Westarp, leader of the opposition, made a sharp attack on Stresemann. "We must all agree," said Westarp, "that the policy of the Chancellor . . . has led to complete failure. The attempt to reach an understanding with France must be regarded as futile. The Chancellor himself admits that. The only

³⁰. Ibid., p. 10. Professor Mowat (p. 251) concludes: "President Ebert, Chancellor Stresemann, Finance Minister Luther, three strong men who 'did not despair of the State,' brought the country through the agony of the Ruhr."

³¹. Stresemann, I, p. 134.

achievement of this 'coalition' in foreign affairs is the abandonment of passive resistance. That is the achievement of a policy that believes it cannot rule without Social Democracy." In his defense Stresemann stated that he did not refuse to combine with the Social Democrats in a fight for the Rhineland. That fight, despite abandonment of passive resistance, had not been abandoned.³² Pierre Lafue, writing for The Living Age, considered the abandonment of passive resistance by Stresemann not as a sign of pacifism but, like Prince Bismarck's "real politik," merely an adaption of policy and language appropriate to the situation.³³ It was a frank admission of what had to be done.

The "great coalition" Cabinet which had withstood the test of abandoning passive resistance was unable to meet new attacks against its domestic policy. The Social Democrats took occasion to differ with the government over the passage of the Enabling Act, providing for abolition of the eight hour day, and its attitude toward Bavaria. On October 3 Stresemann called upon the president to submit the resignation of his cabinet.³⁴ A new cabinet was

32. Ibid.

33. Pierre Lafue, "Germany's Last Six Years--How Stresemann Out-Bismarcked Bismarck," The Living Age, Vol. 337 (Jan. 15, 1930) pp. 606-11.

34. Stresemann, I, pp. 140-2.

re-constituted on the basis of the "great coalition" with Stresemann remaining as Chancellor. The only change of importance was the replacement of Hilferding, a Social Democrat, as Minister of Finance with Dr. Luther, non-party.

The abandonment of passive resistance and the revision of the government in Germany brought no apparent change in the attitude of Poincare. In a public statement at Ligny he said, "It matters not what men rule Germany, and it matters not what kind of government she has; we intend to rest upon our position, which is a clear demand for guarantees both of our security and for the full payment of reparations."³⁵

Following the reconstruction of the Stresemann cabinet, Herr Stinnes, the great industrialist, Otto Wolff, head of the Phoenix Works, and other industrial leaders in Germany entered into agreements with French authorities to make deliveries of coal and coke to France. The industrialists were to be compensated for deliveries by the German government. At a cabinet meeting, Stresemann reported on the negotiations between the German industrialists and French authorities. The Chancellor pointed out that these negotiations would seriously damage the authority of the government. Poincare in answer to German requests to

³⁵. William Stearns Davis, "France and Belgium," Current History, Vol. 19 (Nov. 1923) pp. 322-3.

negotiate could point to the separate negotiations already begun as being preferable to negotiations with the German government.³⁶

In an article published in the Kölnische Zeitung Stresemann wrote: "I cannot but regret that these negotiations were brought to a conclusion without giving notice to the German Government. Though we are hardly in a position to exercise any immediate influence on the negotiations, it is obvious . . . that negotiations by local authorities or organizations ought only to be conducted in close touch with the Government of the Reich."³⁷

In a personal letter to Herr Hugo Stinnes, Stresemann attempted further clarification of his views on these private negotiations. He admitted that at present there were no negotiations between the governments of France and Germany. The Reich government voiced no objections to the industrial organizations' negotiations on their own behalf for the resumption of Ruhr industry, but the government insisted that no agreements be made on matters affecting constitutional or sovereign rights. Due to the financial distress of the Reich, the government could no longer make payments for coal deliveries.³⁸

36. Stresemann, I, pp. 152-5.

37. Ibid., p. 156.

38. Ibid., pp. 157-8.

On October 9 and 10 the German Ambassador in Paris, von Hoersch, attempted to open negotiations with the French Government for some understanding on the Ruhr questions. Stresemann later reported to his cabinet on the outcome of the interview. It was apparent that Poincaré intended to remain in the Ruhr until reparations payments had been made. Poincaré earlier had made it clear that the end of passive resistance meant the restoration of conditions as they had existed before January 11. However, the conditions now demanded by Poincaré would not permit a return to the situation before January 11. At that time the railroads were controlled by Germany and paid taxes to the Reich. Poincaré's demands would virtually hand the railroads over to French control. Germany could not accept such a condition. In no case would Stresemann yield to the cry of the opposition for an open breach with France, nor would Germany resort to any form of coercion. The Allies would not understand such an attitude. Stresemann recommended that a public statement be made suspending all reparations for the time, and a request be made of the Reparations Commission to determine Germany's capacity to pay.³⁹

In keeping with this decision the Chancellor sent an official notice to the Reparations Commission. This communication called attention to President Ebert's decree of

39. Ibid. pp. 173-6.

September 27 halting passive resistance. It announced Germany's intention to resume payments and deliveries in kind under the Versailles Treaty; but urged that the altered situation in the Rhine and Ruhr by their economic and financial severance from the Reich made further deliveries in kind impossible. In pursuance of Article 234 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany now requested from the Reparations Commission an examination of its resources and capacity to pay. The government asked also that it be permitted to state the actual status of the resources and capacity of Germany, and the steps taken by the government to bring about a reform of the budget and the stabilization of its currency. An early hearing by the Commission was desired. ⁴⁰

M. Barthou, President of the Reparations Committee, acted upon the German note by recommending that the Germans be given an early hearing. He requested that after the Germans had been heard a committee of experts belonging to the Allied and Associated powers be set up. "This committee would be entrusted with estimating Germany's present capacity to pay, and with furnishing the Reparations Commission with information enabling it to determine the amounts of German payments to be made during 1924, 1925,

40. Toynbee, 1924, p. 346.

⁴¹
and 1926.

The German delegation, headed by Herr Fischer, was given a hearing on November 23. Herr Fischer reported on the measures already taken in Germany to restore German finances and currency, but declared that the re-establishment of German economic unity was essential to any restoration of her finances or her capacity to pay. The Reparations Commission, having heard the German delegation, adopted a resolution to create two committees of experts. One of these committees would study means of balancing the German budget and stabilizing her currency. The other committee would consider means of estimating the amount of exported capital and means for bringing it back to Germany. These committees were duly constituted during the latter part of December, with General Charles G. Dawes of the United States acting as chairman of the first committee.⁴²

Though Stresemann had declared that order at home was dependent upon foreign policy, he could by no means ignore domestic problems. Through Dr. Luther's efforts at balancing the budget, and with the issue of the Renten mark, some stability was given to German currency. Stresemann's fear of a civil war following the abandonment of passive resist-

41. Ibid., pp. 346-7.

42. Ibid., pp. 347-8.

ance was well founded. Communist uprisings in Saxony were sternly dealt with. The attempted Hitler "Putsch" in Munich dwindled into a riot in the face of force. The outbreak in Bavaria was critical enough to make Stresemann admit to the cabinet: "If the Reichswehr fails, then these groups will get the upper hand; after which a German Nationalist dictatorship will probably follow. If the levies get into Berlin, I shall not go to Stuttgart--they can shoot me down in the place where I have a right to sit."⁴³

Stresemann was convinced that much of Germany's internal distraction was the result of a deliberate French policy to bring the Reich to financial ruin. The French Ambassador made a special call on the Chancellor to explain French anxiety over the Bavarian outbreak. France was filled with rumors of a plot to establish a dictatorship in Germany that would be pledged to repudiation of the Versailles Treaty and, in time, to a war of revenge. The present confusion, Stresemann pointed out, was the result of the failure of his cabinet to achieve any definite results in foreign affairs. The attempted "putsch" in Bavaria would never have materialized if the government had not been driven from one diplomatic failure to another.⁴⁴

⁴³. Stresemann, I, p. 175. For measures taken by the government against Saxony and Bavaria see, Clark, pp. 103-8.

⁴⁴. Stresemann, I, pp. 201-3.

Since the abandonment of passive resistance, the "great coalition" had been under constant attack from the Nationalist Parties of the Reich. As a result of the severe measures used against the Communist uprising in Saxony, Stresemann lost the support of the Social Democrats.⁴⁵ On November 23, unable to secure a vote of confidence in the Reichstag, Stresemann handed in his resignation.

During these one hundred days as Chancellor he had succeeded in making some progress in foreign relations. Prime Minister Baldwin, in an election speech, said that the separation of any territory from Germany would be considered a breach of the Treaty of Versailles. D'Abernon gave further assurance to Maltzan that England could not tolerate an independent Rhine and Ruhr outside Germany.⁴⁶ Stresemann had won his fight for maintaining German sovereignty over the Ruhr and the Rhine. American interests had been aroused in the reparations question according to information received from the American Ambassador, Houghton.⁴⁷ Though no settlement had been reached in the Ruhr dispute, an investigation by economic experts was pending.

45. D'Abernon, p. 291.

46. Stresemann, I, p. 209.

47. Ibid., p. 215.

Note: In an Aide-Memoire from the American Secretary of State to the British Charge, October 15, the United States indicated an interest in the economic (cont.)

situation. The United States government expressed a willingness to participate in an economic conference to consider the capacity of Germany to make reparation payments. The Government emphasized the following points: (1) The United States had no desire to have Germany escape the responsibility of her obligations. (2) Such a conference should be advisory, and its recommendations should not bind the governments. (3) The United States maintained that there was no relation between reparations and inter-Allied debts. See "The Secretary of State to the British Charge (Chilton) Oct. 15, 1923," (Enclosure), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, II, pp. 70-73.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADOPTION OF THE DAWES PLAN

With the resignation of Stresemann as Chancellor President Ebert called upon the leader of the Centrist Party, Wilhelm Marx, to form a new cabinet. The office of Foreign Minister was entrusted to Stresemann, a position he held until his death, October 3, 1929. On presentation of his cabinet to the Reichstag, the new Chancellor said, "I am especially thankful and grateful that my honoured predecessor, Herr Dr. Stresemann, has felt able to take over the post of Foreign Minister in my cabinet. In this way, the continuity of foreign policy, so essential at this juncture is secured."¹ The new arrangement proved advantageous to Stresemann, as he now had the time to devote himself to his primary interest, foreign affairs.

The hoped for relief of tension in the west that Stresemann had anticipated with the renunciation of passive resistance had not yet materialized. In a letter to Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ambassador to Russia, Stresemann voiced extreme pessimism for Germany's future. He was convinced that the French militarists were intent on remaining in the Ruhr. He felt that they intended to turn the district into

¹ I. Stresemann, I, p. 254

a French arsenal and to use it to protect France against any possible attack by Germany. He was much concerned over rumors that had come to him to the effect that France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were pursuing a policy for the dismemberment of Germany.²

Stresemann was convinced that peace for Germany could come only as a result of an understanding between Germany and France. Such an understanding could be found only through open negotiation between the two nations. On December 15, the French Premier received von Hoesch. The object of the German Ambassador's visit was to determine the willingness of France to enter upon diplomatic negotiations with Germany. On December 24, Hoesch again approached Poincaré on the subject. In neither case did Poincaré³ indicate a change in his previous position.

Stresemann addressed himself to the German public on Christmas in an article entitled, "Is This Peace?" There could be no peace for Europe, he wrote, until the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles were restored in the Ruhr and Rhineland. The security that France was constantly demanding could be found in an orderly Germany; here France would find greater security than in any treaty, military

2. Ibid., pp. 255-6.

3. Ibid., p. 258 and p. 261.

convention, or by armament. The Reich, despite criticism, should exhaust all opportunities to reach a true and honorable peace. For the liberation of the Ruhr and Rhineland, Germany was willing to assume any burdens up to its strength. But no German government would ever willingly surrender in the matter of the occupation of the Rhineland and Ruhr.⁴

The dawn of a new year did not bring with it any new hope for Germany. The French strangle hold on the industrial Ruhr remained secure. The demand of Poincaré--no discussion until Germany had paid the last sou of reparations or had handed over productive pledges prior to any discussion--was of course unacceptable to Germany. During the time that the two experts' committees carried on their investigations there was little improvement in the internal situation in Germany. The solution to the reparations problem actually came from France rather than Germany--Poincaré's government⁵ fell in the May elections.

During these early months of 1924 the German foreign office could do little but await the decisions of the investigating committees. Stresemann's activities were directed toward welcoming the committees and aiding them in every way possible in their work. In a New Year's survey

4. Ibid., pp. 262-3.

5. D'Abernon, III, pp. 2-4.

for Die Zeit, Stresemann expressed his appreciation that an international commission should conduct investigations into Germany's capacity to pay.⁶ Again, in a speech to the foreign press, Stresemann said that the German Government would do everything possible to facilitate the work of the committee. The Reich was anxious for the committee to find some solution to the reparations problem. There could be no reparations payments until the economic unity of Germany was restored. "And there I come back to the fundamental principle of German policy, which can be no other than to maintain German sovereignty undiminished within the frontiers laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. If this principle were abandoned, the consequence would be not merely the further ruin of Germany, but inevitably, too, a serious dislocation of French economic life."⁷

The two committees arrived in Berlin on January 29 and 30 to proceed with their investigations. They were welcomed in a speech by Stresemann; he promised cooperation and frankness with all their questions and wishes.⁸ D'Abernon recorded in his diary, on the arrival of the committees, the various things he hoped they would not do: (1) Not milk the cow before it gets on its legs; (2) Not amputate the

6. Stresemann, I, p. 263-4.

7. Ibid., pp. 267-8.

8. Ibid., p. 269.

cow's legs as a step toward getting her on her feet; (3) Not⁹ bleed the animal through ten or twelve different channels.

While awaiting the report of the experts' committees, Stresemann busied himself with preparing the German public to accept the report. Shortly after the arrival of the experts, Stresemann interviewed Mr. Young, American chairman of the second committee, on the progress being made. He imposed upon Mr. Young the need to convince German industrialists whose support was essential to fulfillment of any¹⁰ plan.

On April 9 the experts submitted their report to the reparations committee in Paris. The report recommended among other things the restoration of German economic unity, a condition that could be accomplished only through evacuation of the Ruhr. A gold note bank, with a board composed of German and foreign members, was to receive the reparations payment. Coercive measures were to be applied against Germany only in the event of flagrant default. The plan was based on the idea of fixing the maximum payment that Germany could make; it avoided, however, fixing the total

9. D'Abernon, III, p. 45

10. Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations, (London: 1939) p. 76.

11

amount once and for all.

At a speech at Schneidemühl Stresemann discussed the recommendations of the experts. He stated that the report was an attempt to grasp the situation in Germany from an economic point of view. The plan imposed heavy burdens upon the German people, and it permitted foreign cooperation in the administration of the state railways. Germany's fulfillment would be possible only if economic, fiscal, and administrative sovereignty was re-established.

Only on the understanding that the sacrifices to be endured by the German people are mainly for the benefit of the population of the occupied area, and that a period of quiet and peaceful development is guaranteed to the German Reich within undisputed frontiers of German sovereignty, can the experts' report be regarded as the basis for a discussion of the proposed cooperation in the settlement of the reparations question.¹²

Keeping in mind these reservations, the cabinet voted in the affirmative to accept the report of the experts. The decision was followed in a note which was published on the 16th of April. The cabinet informed the reparations commission that it regarded the report as a basis for the solution of the reparations problem and that it was ready¹³ to collaborate in the experts' projects. Nine days later

11. For official text see: World Peace Foundation, Reparation, Part V., "The Dawes Report," 1923. (Superseding the earlier edition of Vol. VI, No. 5, containing the N. Y. Times version) pp. 364-498.

12. Stresemann, I, pp. 331-2.

13. Literary Digest, Vol. 81, No. 5 (May 3, 1924)

the Allies announced their acceptance of the report.

In an article in Die Zeit entitled "Political Easter" Stresemann commented on the allied acceptance, and defended himself against the sharp criticism of the German Nationalists. It was true, he wrote, that the proposal placed many heavy burdens upon the German people, but in comparison with what they had had to suffer in the Ruhr, these burdens were minor. What Germany was fighting for was the restoration of its freedom and for a more friendly attitude towards Germany from the rest of the world. In this report was the key to the pacification of Europe. In answer to charges levied against the government by Helfferich, prominent Nationalist leader, Stresemann pointed out that the experts' report contained many of the proposals previously put forward by the Cuno Government--proposals that Helfferich and the German National Party had supported. It was true that the nation lost part of its sovereignty over financial matters, but as conditions existed France controlled completely a portion of the Reich railways. At present there was a united front of the Allies in favor of maintaining the economic unity of Germany. Stresemann interpreted the report as meaning the end of French and Belgian intervention in Germany.

14. Stresemann, I, pp. 333-8.

The experts' report became the main issue of the parliamentary elections set for May. The extremists on the left and right took advantage of every opportunity to attack the Dawes Plan and the parties supporting it. They painted a depressing picture for Germany if she accepted the proposal. The Nationalists charged that the enemies of Germany wanted to control the state and choke her industry. They urged the landowners and industrialists to fight the proposal. The industrialists, according to reports in the New York Times, refused to go along with the Nationalists. "We must try to favor the pill," the industrialists were quoted, "though we may die in the attempt, because if we reject the report, we would only be helping the French." Dr. Schacht, head of the Reichsbank, spoke in favor of the plan.¹⁵

Stresemann attempted to answer these accusations and defended the plan in a great speech at Magdeburg. This report of the experts would give Germany the needed period of rest to re-establish her industry and stabilize her currency by granting the country a three-year moratorium. It virtually assured economic unity for Germany. If she rejected the plan, Germany would turn the whole world against her, and give Poincaré a free hand. "Our affirmative answer was not at all welcome in Paris." The cabinet had not

15. Literary Digest, Vol. 81, No. 3, (Apr. 19, 1924) p. 6.

accepted the report through fear of what might have happened had they refused, but rather out of a sense of responsibility to take advantage of every opportunity to re-establish relations with the twelve million Germans in the occupied territories. In a surge of rhetoric Stresemann urged Germany to a course "through work and sacrifice to freedom! It is of course open to anyone to say: Nonsense! Through power to freedom! Give me the power! But if I have not the power I must take what I need to achieve freedom." The real issue was not economic, but rather political.¹⁵ "The decision that confronts us is whether the policy of Louis XIV is to be carried out in the twentieth century, whether France is to remain on the Rhine and continue to own the whole economic area of the Ruhr, the greatest armorer's workshop of the world, and exploit it for her own imperialistic purposes, or whether this French imperialism is to be broken and the unity of the Reich restored. Because I today place policy before any questions of finance, I say that it would be a pitiable government that did not do its utmost to get back the Rhine and the Ruhr."¹⁶

Despite the efforts of Stresemann, his party received only forty-five seats as against the sixty-six in the previous Reichstag. The greatest gains were made by the German

¹⁶. Stresemann, I, pp. 338-9.

National People's Party and the Communists. The Moderate Parties who were pledged to the acceptance of the report, however, still retained a working majority in the Reichstag.¹⁷ D'Abernon asked Stresemann why there had been a decided swing to the right, despite the fact that the present government had improved the currency, quashed the separatists in the western "Länder," and was now pursuing a policy that promised a solution of the reparations problem. Stresemann felt that the masses had a general hatred of the Jews. The Jews, they said, were rich while they were poor, and the government followed a policy of the rich. Added to this was the hatred of France by the man in the street. The people asked, "Why has the government allowed France to bully Germany?"¹⁸ Stresemann regretted that there were two circumstances that worked against a reasonable policy in Germany. First there was the Berlin press. One faction was a nationalist Protestant section that was utterly ignorant of foreign affairs and chauvinistic, and the other section was intelligent in foreign affairs but aroused distrust because of Semitic control. The second danger was the large women's vote. They were either monarchists or communists and had no sense for "real politik." In Germany, Stresemann com-

17. Literary Digest, Vol. 81, No. 7, (May 7, 1924) p. 1.

18. D'Abernon, III, p. 51.

plained, the leading statesmen always met with more opposition than was the situation in other countries. He cited the case of Bismarck when he published his report that he would resign if he did not receive more support from the throne. Bismarck had expected the public to come to his defense. Instead, the people said, "It is about time the Old Man retired."¹⁹ In Germany a statesman was popular only after he resigned.

Though it may have appeared from the election returns that the German people had repudiated the experts' report, Stresemann did not so interpret it. He laid his foreign policy before the various parties for consideration. The policy stated that the government assumed that the report guaranteed German sovereignty and the liberation of occupied territories. The government, therefore, favored acceptance. When the German Nationalists declined to take part in the new government, the cabinet was again formed on a moderate basis with Marx as chancellor, and Stresemann retaining his²⁰ position as foreign minister.

On two different occasions the American ambassador, Houghton, expressed his fear that the swing to the right²¹ might delay the pending American loan. Stresemann did

19. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

20. Stresemann, I, pp. 345-6.

21. Ibid., p. 342.

not believe that the change in party strength would in any way affect the acceptance of the report.²² In a confidential interview with Colonel James Logan, the unofficial observer of the United States at the Reparation Commission, Stresemann discussed the political situation more in detail. In answer to a query by Logan as to what Herriot, the new French premier, could do to lighten the task of the German government, Stresemann explained the political situation. The German Nationals would not dare to reject the report. Rejection would bring them into opposition with the large industrial and agricultural interests, the main source of German Nationalist support. Despite the realization of economic necessity, public opinion in Germany could accept the report only if measures were taken to return German exiles and prisoners in French jails to their homes. Some definite assurance should be given that military occupation would cease on some fixed and definite date.²³ In a letter to Barthou, President of the Reparation Commission, Logan commented on this interview. He felt that the Germans were not attempting to force "conditions" prior to acceptance, but that they needed Allied support to secure adoption of the plan by the Reichstag.²⁴

22. Ibid., p. 344.

23. Daves, pp. 247-51.

24. Ibid., pp. 255-61.

On June 17, the new French cabinet presented itself before the Chamber of Deputies. At this time Herriot expressed his desire for more amicable relations with Germany. He was opposed to a policy of force that should lead to occupation; evacuation of the Ruhr, however, was not feasible until Germany accepted the Dawes Plan without reservation. "Our cabinet," he stated, "is animated by a kindly spirit toward Germany and we are ready to assist to the best of our ability the young German democracy, but we will display merciless severity to the German Nationalists."²⁵

In a speech at Dessau, Stresemann replied to Herriot's announcement. He welcomed Herriot's conciliatory attitude, and Germany looked forward to an era of peaceful neighborliness, an indispensable condition for the steady development of affairs in Europe.²⁶

On June 21st the prime minister of England, MacDonald, and the French premier, Herriot, met at Chequers, England, to work and plan for the adoption of the Dawes report. They agreed, if the other Allies consented, to hold a conference in London not later than the middle of July. From Chequers MacDonald and Herriot sent a letter to Marx re-

²⁵. Literary Digest, Vol. 81, No. 13 (June 28, 1924) p. 18.

²⁶. Stresemann, I, p. 352.

questing an investigation of Germany by the Military Control Commission to disquiet rumors of the increasing activity of nationalistic and militarist associations in Germany.²⁷

In a press report, Stresemann issued a blunt report to the allied demands for an investigation. He stated that the next few weeks would show whether a new spirit of understanding or the old policy of violence was to prevail in Europe. This was definitely to be the last investigation of its kind in Europe. The reason for Germany's present acquiescence was her desire to accelerate the execution of the Dawes report. Germany requested on her part first the economic, and then eventually the complete, evacuation of the Ruhr. No German government could secure a majority in the Reichstag if it favored continued occupation of the Ruhr. It was his hope to see the evacuation that had prompted the acquiescence in renewed allied military control. He minimized the rumor that organizations in Germany were plotting a war of revenge. There existed in Germany three types of organizations. First, there were organizations fostering sports. Their program was a physical training program that was much less developed than in England and America. The second type was that of military organizations whose activities amounted to banner-

²⁷. Toynbee, 1924, pp. 365-7; Mowat, p. 272.

waving and displaying insignia. The Government would take steps to curb their activities. He denied that the Reichswehr was a potential disturber of peace. The third consisted of purely political organizations.²⁹

The acquiescence on the part of the Government was sufficient for the nationalistic press, the Kreuzzeitung, to attack the cabinet. The paper demanded an outright refusal of the Anglo-French demand. The Marx-Stresemann cabinet, it charged, had seen fit to disdain the warning of the German Nationalist Party and had bowed shamelessly before the Allies.²⁹

The inter-Allied conference assembled in London on July 16, 1924, for the purpose of working out measures needed to put the Dawes proposal into effect. After the Allied powers had arrived at a general agreement, an invitation was issued to the German Government to be present for the fifth plenary meeting. The German delegation of Chancellor Marx, Foreign Minister Stresemann, Minister of Finance Luther, and Secretary of State von Schubert arrived in London on the 5th of August.

In the welcoming speech, MacDonald informed the German delegation that the Allied Governments had reached

²⁸. Literary Digest, Vol. 82, No. 4. (July 26, 1924) p. 17.

²⁹. Ibid., Vol. 82, No. 5. (Aug. 2, 1924) p. 21

certain agreements, some of which they wished to discuss with the German government. The discussion must be confined to questions arising out of the application of the experts' report.³⁰

In the first regular meeting Chancellor Marx in a low and unemotional voice read the prepared German memoranda, suggesting clarification or changes in the reports. The questions raised were interpretations of the matter of "default," economic and financial evacuation, and amnesty. In the debates that followed, Snowden, chancellor of the exchequer, suggested the formation of a sub-committee to work out the technical questions involved. Herriot vigorously opposed this suggestion. The excitement displayed by Herriot spread to other members of the conference.³¹

³⁰. Stresemann, I, p. 371. For a discussion on the London Conference prior to the arrival of the German delegation, see Mowat, pp. 273-6.

Stresemann, on the train to the London Conference, had reminded the other German delegates that the real subject of it could not be discussed--the evacuation of the Ruhr. (See Vallentin, p. 158.)

³¹. Stresemann, I, p. 374.

In his diary Stresemann wrote, "that impossible translator," who, in the translation of Marx's calm address, considerably heightened the key thus destroying the good impression the German delegation had hoped to make. On the English side, particularly by Sir Maurice Hankey, General Secretary of the Conference, and Sir Eyre Crowe, the belief was that the bad impression made by Marx resulted from the translator's tone. (See Ibid., p. 375.) Another of the delegates commented, "the translator transforms a lamb into a tiger." (See D'Abernon, III, p. 100.) The work of the delegation throughout the conference was hindered by incompetent translators. On another occasion, Stern-Rubarth reports that Stresemann whispered to his interpreter for a match to light his cigar. The interpreter jumped up, interrupted a debate between British and French delegates, and shouted, "The German Foreign Minister requests a match." (See Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Three Men Tried, London: 1939.)

Though the questions raised by Marx were important in themselves, they were not of such a difficult nature as to delay or interrupt the conference.³² The real issue on which the Germans felt they had to have a definite answer was that of the evacuation of the Ruhr; yet the discussion of the Ruhr evacuation was not on the agenda of the conference. Any decision to be reached on this question would have to be accomplished in private meetings. In the July meeting between MacDonald and Herriot, the British prime minister stated: "the Germans cannot accept a settlement without previously discussing the question of the evacuation of the Ruhr. We cannot take part in the discussion, but you must settle with the Germans."³³ The first effort to open the discussion resulted in a meeting between Dr. Breitscheid, a member of the Reichstag, and Herriot. The French premier wanted to know whether the German delegation

32. Note: The New Statesman in its weekly review of politics reported that on all other questions, except evacuation of the Ruhr, the Conference had reached an agreement. Unless a definite understanding was reached on the question of evacuation the Conference would break up. The German delegates must secure a definite date for complete evacuation on not too far distant a date if they hope to have their agreements accepted by the Reichstag or the German public. Herriot finds himself in the difficult position of either returning to Paris "empty handed or else having to explain away concessions." The New Statesman, "Comments," Vol. 23, No. 591. (Aug. 16, 1924) p. 533.

33. D'Abernon, III, p. 99.

was willing to negotiate on the basis that the Ruhr should be evacuated after the conclusion of military control. On this basis Herriot need have no apprehensions on the question of security. If the position developed, as Herriot hoped, evacuation might begin at once. Finally, Herriot suggested his desire to conclude a security pact between France and Germany, perhaps on the basis of Cuno's offer. Marx and Stresemann objected to connecting the evacuation of the Ruhr with military control. A mutual security pact would be welcomed by Germany.

The first meeting between Stresemann and Herriot took place after a dinner given by the American ambassador, Kellogg. Herriot informed the German foreign minister that he was leaving for Paris the next day, because of difficulties with his cabinet. The dispute in the French cabinet resulted from the German demand for a settlement of the Ruhr question. Stresemann in turn explained that the political situation in Germany was such that an answer on the Ruhr was urgent. Herriot expressed his sympathy for the German statesman's position. He understood that he needed some equivalent for the great financial sacrifices Germany would assume under the Dawes proposal. Stresemann stated that he would be interrogated by the foreign affairs committee

34. Stresemann, I, p. 381.

of the Reichstag as to the date when military evacuation might be expected. This territory, he said, should be evacuated in a reasonable time--measured by months. Herriot expressed his agreement. He admitted that Poincaré had not kept his promise to evacuate after the abandonment of passive resistance.
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Following Herriot's return from Paris the two ministers met for a second time. Herriot immediately explained that his purpose in going to Paris had been to get the consent of his cabinet to discuss the problem of evacuation. He had obtained their consent only on the basis that the evacuation would be completed in the process of a year. If he went further he might be overthrown by the Senate. Stresemann realized the French political situation, and for that reason had opposed German demands that acceptance of the experts' plan be conditional on immediate evacuation. But the interval of one year was too long. He urged Herriot to propose a shorter interval, and asked if the evacuation could not begin at once. For Germany not only the concluding day but the commencing date was important. Herriot said he would take advantage of every opportunity to shorten

35. Ibid., pp. 384-6 (Note: The interpretation of what transpired in this and a subsequent meeting is based on Stresemann's notes and may not necessarily conform to Herriot's interpretation.)

36

the interval.

On August 13 the German, French, and Belgian delegates met for a decisive discussion on the question of evacuation. Herriot's attitude was no longer so compromising as it had been on the two previous meetings. He stressed the point that he had gone to the London Conference after assuring his cabinet that there would be no discussion of the evacuation question. The present discussion placed him and his cabinet in a dangerous position. It was impossible for him to agree to evacuation in stages before the end of the year. Despite Stresemann's arguments that a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag was necessary to pass the appropriate laws to put the Dawes Plan into effect, the Belgian premier supported Herriot's concession as being far reaching. At the conclusion of the meeting Herriot put out a definite statement of his personal position:

I propose the following formula:

The maximum delay of one year, because I do not agree to any lesser period and because I am not empowered by the French Government to do so.

If, however, the relations between France and Germany soon improve, if as the result of our common efforts the state of public opinion alters, I will gladly consider either a reduction in the army of occupation, or of the occupied area, or something even more favorable.

I can give no official assurance that would be binding.

I can only give expression to a wish and hope.³⁷

36. Ibid., pp. 389-91.

37. Ibid., pp. 394-6.

During a midnight meeting, Stresemann discussed the negotiations of the French and Belgians with MacDonald. MacDonald said that the American ambassador, Kellogg, had expressed his support for Herriot's proposal, which considerably strengthened the French position. Stresemann offered as a possible solution that the evacuation be executed by stages starting with Düsseldorf and Ruhrt. The evacuation should start from the date of the acceptance of the experts' plan e. g. in April. MacDonald felt that further concessions from Herriot were improbable.³⁸

On August 15 the German delegates received an answer from their cabinet in Berlin for the authority to accept Herriot's proposal. The cabinet approved the proposal in principle, but fresh efforts were to be made to secure a reduction in troops, and that the evacuation by stages begin before the year was up. Herriot refused further concessions,³⁹ but asked the German delegation to trust him.

The formal signing of the London protocol took place on the 15th of August. In his concluding speech MacDonald referred to the accomplishments of the conference as the "first peace treaty, because we sign it with a feeling that

38. Ibid., pp. 396-7.

39. Ibid., pp. 402-3.

Herriot proposed to regard the date of the signature of the London agreements as a starting point for the interval of a year.

we have turned our backs on the terrible years of war and war mentality."⁴⁰ A New York World's correspondent in an interview with Stresemann reported the German foreign minister as saying that he had not signed the protocol with bitterness, but would like to point out that in 1918 Germany had laid down her arms on the basis of Wilson's fourteen points and a dictated peace followed. The German people had agreed at the conference to greater sacrifices than any other people in the history of the world. "I believe the Reichstag will ratify our work, but I call upon the world to keep faith this time. The pact of London is capable of inaugurating a new Europe only if strict faith is kept." As a concluding remark, Stresemann said he expected the evacuation to begin in less than a year.⁴¹

As could be expected, the German Nationalists opened their attack on the Dawes Plan when the London agreement was submitted for a vote to the Reichstag. Since a constitutional change was involved, a two-thirds majority was required for passage. Much of the antagonism of the Nationalists was due to the fact that Marx and Stresemann had virtually promised the Nationalists that they would bring up the question of "war guilt"

40. Toynbee, 1924, pp. 384.

41. Literary Digest, Vol. 82, No. 9. (Aug. 30, 1924) p. 16.

42

at the London Conference. It was only through promises to the German Nationalists that the government would issue a statement to the Allies on the subject of "war guilt," along with undue pressure on the part of the heavy industry, that the Nationalist party was split enough to secure passage of the Dawes Plan.⁴³

Dr. Vögler, a leader of German heavy industry, agreed with Stresemann that the London agreement must be accepted. "But you don't yourself really believe that the French will ever go out of the Ruhr?" he asked. "We will talk of this again a year hence, Herr Vögler," Stresemann replied.⁴⁴

With the acceptance of the Dawes Plan, Stresemann had helped Germany to a solution of the reparations problem. But far more important to Stresemann than the solution of the reparations problem was the opportunity the conference provided for an actual personal interview with the French premier. It was out of these interviews that a definite promise for the evacuation of the Ruhr had been obtained. Stresemann had followed through in his interpretation of

42. D'Abernon, III, p. 93. Note: The German delegation had actually inserted the subject of "war guilt" in the speech Marx was to deliver at the final meeting in London. The subject was stricken from the speech at the insistence of MacDonald. (See Stresemann, II, pp. 404-5.)

43. Vallentin, p. 162. Clark writes that the members of the Reichstag were better patriots than partisans. Clark, pp. 111-12.

44. Stresemann, I, p. 408.

"real politik;" not having the power, he would seize every opportunity to gain his objective. As he had stated many times before, his objective at the present was to maintain German sovereignty over the area prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles. These conversations also provided an opportunity for approaching the subject of allied occupation in the Rhine--the subject of French security.

As an anti-climax to the meetings between Stresemann and Herriot, Professor Rostov of the Yale Law School in an article for the New York Times magazine section referred to information Sumner Welles reputedly received from Herriot. Stresemann was to have approached Herriot secretly with a proposal for a military treaty between the two nations to the exclusion of England. To this proposal Herriot replied, "How could any nation have faith in Germany when a German leader, who was above all others identified as the prophet of German regeneration, was willing to stoop to treachery of so low and grotesque a character?"⁴⁵

In a subsequent issue of the New York Times Wolfgang Stresemann, son of the Foreign Minister, flatly denied the accusation. Daniel M. Stevenson, Chancellor of the University of Glasgow came to the defense of Wolfgang Stresemann

⁴⁵. Eugene V. Rostov, "Germany: A Warning," New York Times, Magazine, Sec. 6. (June 6, 1948) p. 38.

in a letter in which he stated that he personally had arranged the only meetings between Stresemann and Herriot, and that he was personally present. He also denied that anything of a secret treaty was mentioned. Wolfgang further defended his father by asserting that Herriot would certainly have notified MacDonald of the proposed "treachery."⁴⁶ Not to have done so would have displayed disloyalty to the entente still existing between England and France.

In Stresemann's papers there is mention of only two meetings between himself and Herriot in which matters not on the agenda of the conference were discussed. At the first meeting Ambassador Kellogg was present. To make such a proposal at that time would have been utter stupidity. At the second meeting Mr. Stevenson was present. That such a proposal would have been made at that time seemed unlikely. Considering, also, the extent to which Herriot jeopardized his political strength in France with the concessions he made for the evacuation of the Ruhr, it appears likely that Herriot would have informed both MacDonald and Kellogg of the proposal, and thus relieved himself of the pressure these statesmen were exerting upon him for concessions to Germany. Is it possible that if such a proposal had been offered, that Herriot, at the time considered it feasible?

⁴⁶. New York Times, June 13, 1948. p. 83.

CHAPTER V

THE SECURITY PACT

In an interview with Louis Fischer, Stresemann outlined his foreign policy as a three-fold objective: evacuation of the Rhineland, ultimate abolition of reparations, and alteration of the statutes that separate East Prussia from the Fatherland by the Polish Corridor. "The occupation of the Rhineland," he stated, "does not harm us economically, but no minister can remain in office who does not strive to clear the province and thus comply with the wishes of all Germans. With respect to East Prussia, there can never be perfect relations with Poland." To this declaration Stresemann added, "In view of our immediate aims: Reparations, Rhineland, East Prussia, we cannot forego¹ our policy of an understanding with France."

The Dawes Plan had at least temporarily solved the problem of reparations, and given promise of an early evacuation of the Ruhr by the French. The evacuation of the Cologne

1. How close was Stresemann's position on the eastern boundary question to that of the Nationalist Party is apparent from the following statements by Professor Otto Hoetzsch, a prominent Nationalist: "In pursuance of the Treaty of Versailles and its provisions, portions of unimpeachably German territory have been incorporated in Poland, and conditions have been created, especially in the Corridor and Upper Silesia, which render impossible any permanent peace, tranquillity, or order." "I ardently urge that peace cannot be preserved unless those germs of conflict are removed which lie slumbering in the present delimitation of the frontiers as fixed between Poland and Germany." "The great idea of Locarno is to settle differences between states, not, as heretofore, by an appeal to arms, but by a peaceful appeal to the principle of arbitration. But that idea cannot be realized by anyone who fails to appreciate that the foundation of the present arrangements on Germany's eastern frontier contains in itself the germs of conflict." Hoetzsch, Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies (New Haven, 1929), pp. 102-3, 109.

zone by British occupation forces was due on January 10, 1925.²
 The need existed then of finding an understanding with France before approaching the real objective of his policy, the elimination of the Polish Corridor.

The British Premier addressed a letter to the French government to the effect that the evacuation of the Cologne zone depended on unqualified consent by Germany to disarm. In order to determine the extent of German disarmament, a general inspection of the Reich started on September 8. The inspection dragged on until it became obvious that a general report would not be ready by January 10, the date for evacuation. In December, 1924, Lord Curzon said to the House of Lords that the report to the control commission had been delayed by obstructions from the Germans. After the report was completed the Allies would discuss whether Germany had complied sufficiently with the treaty to warrant evacuation. A note from the conference of ambassadors on the 5th of January to the German government informed the Reich that the evacuation would be postponed. The Reich was charged with various defaults: reconstruction under another form of the General Staff; recruiting and training of short-term recruits; failure to demilitarize factories; retention of surplus war materials; and failure to reorganize the police.³

At the cabinet meeting regarding the note, Stresemann recommended that the German answer be brief, and await

2. Article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the northernmost Cologne zone might be evacuated in five years provided Germany fulfilled the conditions of the treaty.

3. Toynbee, 1925, II, pp. 179-82.

further pronouncements following the completion of the investigation. The German answer should stress the serious effect of non-evacuation on the general policy of the London Conference. Further, the Allies should be asked for evidence so that the government might provide explanations.⁴

During a visit from Albert Thomas, director of the International Labor Office Geneva, Stresemann expressed his desire to reach some compromise on the question of evacuation. The government was willing to discuss any discrepancies found in the investigation. On a reference by Stresemann to the security question, Thomas felt that it might be misunderstood in France just as the previous offer by Cuno had been.⁵

To Stresemann, as to other German statesmen, it was obvious that any relaxation of pressure by France on the western frontier would have to be coupled with French security. Dr. Cuno had attempted to solve the problem by proposing his Rhine pact. Poincare had, instead, elected to occupy the Ruhr area. As Chancellor, Stresemann on several different occasions had indicated he was willing to extend the Cuno offer for French security.⁶ Later as foreign minister in a review of the reparations question,

4. Stresemann, II, p. 24

5. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

6. Ibid., I, p. 96 and p. 100

he mentioned the necessity of finding a solution to the French security problem in some form other than the Rhine pact which was unacceptable to France.⁷ In an address at Stuttgart in 1923, Stresemann had made his first actual offer for forming a security pact. "If the nations," he spoke, "ever confer in order to secure to each other for a fixed period the integrity of the present territorial rights, Germany will always be prepared to join them, to prevent danger of renewed clashes, and renewed bloodshed and loss of national strength."⁸

Since the close of the war, France had been seeking for security over and above the Treaty of Versailles. She had drawn up the tri-partite pact of 1919 with Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, only to have the United States Senate refuse ratification. In 1922 at Cannes she failed again in her attempt at greater security. France had, however, formed close military alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia. During the year 1924, the British Labor Government, under MacDonald, and the French Premier Herriot engaged in negotiations of the Geneva Protocol.

In viewing the question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone, Stresemann could see little hope for an early

7. Ibid., p. 285.

8. Stern-Rubarth, p. 75

solution. England with her difficulties in Egypt and the present Moslem disturbances in India needed the support of France, and was willing to make concessions to France on the Cologne zone.⁹ Yet he was convinced that France would eventually get some security agreement. He also felt that any security agreement without Germany would be an agreement against Germany.¹⁰ The question remained of how to approach the subject, and in what form the approach should be made.

The initiative in suggesting discussion of the problem of French security came from the British Ambassador, D'Abernon, in private conversation with Secretary of State von Schubert. He suggested that Germany make a proposal to the Allies along the lines of the Cuno offer, omitting the decision for war after plebiscite. Schubert and D'Abernon confidentially talked of a security pact as das Kind. Schubert at the time expressed his willingness to enter into an agreement with all countries interested in the Rhine,¹¹ but refused a similar agreement for the Polish frontier.

9. Stresemann, II, p. 15

10. Ibid., p. 98.

11. D'Abernon, III, p. 121. Stresemann in his private papers of July 1, 1925, agrees that the first suggestion, a casual one, came from the English Ambassador on December 29. (See Stresemann, II, p. 98.) Daniel Stevenson in his letter to Wolfgang Stresemann considers the London meetings of Stresemann, Herriot and himself the beginning of the Locarno Pact. (See New York Times, June 13, 1948, p. 83.)

Out of this suggestion by D'Abernon came the German note of January 20 that eventually developed into the Locarno Pact. The note was treated as ultra-confidential, seen only by Chancellor Luther¹² and the foreign office.¹³ The note was dispatched through D'Abernon to the British foreign office. It was actually an unofficial inquiry by the German government as to how to proceed in advancing a security proposal that might meet with British approval. In the note Germany recognized the importance of the security issue in the French attitude toward Germany. It expressed German willingness to enter into an agreement to secure peaceful relations with France. Such a pact, the note suggested, could be combined with arbitration treaties between Germany and other European states interested. Germany would agree to recognize the present frontier on the Rhine and fulfill her obligations of demilitarizing the Rhineland as prescribed under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁴

12. Luther replaced Marx as Chancellor of the Reich on January 15.

13. D'Abernon, III, p. 127.

14. The Charge in Great Britain (Sterling) to the Secretary of State, March 16, 1925, (Enclosure), Foreign Relations, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 22-3.

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Das Kind seemed doomed to an early death. The German government waited impatiently for an answer from England, but none came. On January 29, an article appeared in Die Zeit denying the rumor that the German government had made any security proposals. Stresemann admitted to D'Abernon that the purpose of the article was to make England realize that unless an answer was received Germany would not persist in its proposal. In fact Stresemann was seriously considering a withdrawal of his offer.¹⁶ D'Abernon explained that English silence was unquestionably due to the fact that England could not receive confidential negotiations from Germany unless she could discuss it with her allies. The information that D'Abernon did receive from London indicated that the German proposal was premature, coming at

15. Vallentin and Stern-Rubarth both feel that D'Abernon's suggestion for a security pact was motivated by his fear of an eventual Russo-German alliance. (See: Vallentin, p. 182, and Stern-Rubarth, p. 76.) Neither of these explanations gives the full reason for D'Abernon's suggestion. Throughout the three volumes of his diaries runs the fear of a Russo-German alliance and French hegemony of the continent, both of which would be realized by a security pact that excluded Germany. There also was the fear that England would be obligating herself too much under the proposed Geneva Protocol. A mutual security pact between France and Germany with England as arbiter would give England an advantage in the balance of power. See, D'Abernon, I, p. 24-5 and III, p. 141 and pp. 183-184, and D'Abernon quoted in Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, (London: 1936) pp. 229-330.

16. D'Abernon, III, p. 132-3.

a time when discussions were still under way on the Geneva
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 Protocol.

On February 9 the German government for the second time took the initiative by transmitting a confidential memorandum to Herriot. The memorandum was similar to the January 20 note to England in proposing a security pact for the Rhine by the interested states with the United States¹⁸ as trustee. The French memorandum suggested further that it would be possible to "so draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all states" in such a manner that it could eventually be absorbed¹⁹ by the League of Nations.

The French answer to the German memorandum was handed to Herr von Hoesch, German Ambassador in Paris on February 20.

¹⁷. Ibid., p. 137. Chamberlain in a speech in the House of Commons, March 5, referring to the German note of January 20, definitely stated that he could not receive communications of this kind without the right to speak of them to England's allies. (See Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 19n.)

¹⁸. The German Ambassador in Washington informed the American Secretary of State of the proposition made by Germany to France and England for a joint security pact to secure France. The proposal referred to the United States as trustee of such an agreement. The Secretary said that the United States would not make any guarantees. Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the German Ambassador (Maltzan), March 16, 1925, Foreign Relations, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹. World Peace Foundation, "The Locarno Conference, October 5-16, 1925." Vol. 9, No. 1. (Boston: 1926) pp. 33-34.

The reply stated that the French government had carefully examined the German communication, but France could give no definite answer until an agreement on security had been reached with her allies.²⁰

Austin Chamberlain, British Foreign Minister, in a discussion on British foreign policy in the House of Commons March 5, referred to the German memorandum. He mentioned the fact that now that the German government had repeated it to England's allies, he attached great importance to it.²¹ On the following day, while in transit to Geneva, Chamberlain stopped at Paris to inform Herriot of Britain's refusal to sign the Geneva Protocol,²² and discussed with other representatives the German proposal.²³

²⁰. Ibid., p. 34.

²¹. Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 19. Vallentin states that Lloyd George, on seeing the German note, said "This is of the highest importance. It is the first time that we have listened to so substantial an offer. Am I to understand that Germany is ready of free will to recognize the frontiers in the west, and will not ask for any reconsiderations or revision of these frontiers?" Following this statement, Chamberlain became the champion of the pact. (See Vallentin, p. 188.)

²². The Charge' in Great Britain (Sterling) to the American Secretary of State:

"It would appear fairly certain, however, that the British will attempt to induce France to include Germany in any pact. On the understanding, of course, that Germany will first enter on an equal footing into the League of Nations." Foreign Relations, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 21-22.

²³. Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 23.

On March 18 Chamberlain delivered an address before the Council of the League of Nations in which he outlined the British government's objections to the Geneva Protocol. The speech, for the time being, sealed the fate of the ²⁴ Protocol.

With the Geneva Protocol out of the way a series of meetings among Allied governments ensued to pursue further the solution of the security question. Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons on Britain's policy. He went into a lengthy discussion of the German proposal, and the necessity of England's engaging with others to insure the security of the Low Countries. He expressed a willingness to enter into agreements to stabilize peace in the west, but declined to extend the same guarantee to every frontier, i. e. the Polish frontier. He did not believe that either Germany or Poland was interested in disturbing the eastern frontier. He did, however, feel that it was essential for Germany to ²⁵ enter the League of Nations. The situation in Germany was complicated further by the death of President Ebert

24. World Peace Foundation, "Sixth Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1926," Vol. 9, No. 3-4, 1926, pp. 173-176.

25. Toynbee, 1926, II, pp. 27-29. For a general discussion among the allied nations on the German proposal see Toynbee, 1926, II, pp. 25-49. For the interchange of Franco-British correspondence see: George Glasgow, From Dawes to Locarno, (New York: 1926) Appendix One and pp. 77-84; Mowat, pp. 310-318.

and the pending election of a new president. In a press report from France Herriot announced that France would delay negotiations until after the German election. A treaty with the Left was one thing, with the Right, who opposed the treaty, another. Under any conditions, there would be no security compact until Germany joined the League. France would consider no treaty that would infringe on the Treaty of Versailles or the rights of the Allies.²⁶

During the interval between the allied discussions Germany could take no more definite action until a detailed answer to her February offer was received.²⁷ In Germany Stresemann launched a press campaign for the purpose of answering attacks against him and to hasten allied action. His first statement to the press was made on March 7. He explained the reason for secrecy and the action the German government had taken thus far. He stated that, had the contents of the original demarches been known in the other

²⁶. Literary Digest, Vol. 85, No. 2 (April 11, 1925) p. 17.

²⁷. During the period of waiting, Stresemann despaired of the success of his proposal, and several times was on the verge of dropping the subject. At the time Stresemann was sitting for his portrait by Augustus John. During these sittings D'Abernon encouraged Stresemann to persist in the proposal, and emphasized the importance of a mutual security agreement. The British Ambassador felt that these sittings gave new life to das Kind. See D'Abernon, III, p. 153.

countries, opposition would quickly have put an end to further negotiations.²⁸ He explained that Germany had as yet made no definite proposals, but expressed a willingness to enter into negotiations for an international security pact. The real threat to peace, Stresemann continued, was French imperialism in the Rhineland. Such a pact would insure the Rhineland to Germany. In answer to charges that Germany had renounced Alsace-Lorraine he said that the German people would not now, nor later, follow a government which entered into an aggressive war to reconquer the two provinces. Referring to the charges of the Rote Fahne that the German government considered the Polish frontier as fixed, he said that Germany would not make an official guarantee to fix the frontiers of the east. Although Germany did not contemplate a change of the frontiers at the present time, she reserved the right under Article 19 of the League of Nations to seek a peaceful solution in the future.²⁹ To the London Times Stresemann reported that a mutual guaranty pact for the western frontier, with the

28. D'Abernon, discussing das Kind with Schubert, said that if the January 10 and February 9 notes had been published at the time they had been dispatched to England and France das Kind would have died, and Stresemann would have departed this life with it. (See D'Abernon, III, p. 21)

29. Stresemann, II, pp. 62-71.

renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine, would be a complete change in Germany's historical position, but it would also mean the renunciation by France of her desire for a frontier on the Rhine.³⁰

To forestall an eventual attack from the German National Party, Stresemann met with members of that group to explain the possible benefits that might accrue to Germany from a mutual security pact. He believed that it would bring about a joint evacuation of the Ruhr and the Cologne Zone by August 14, 1925, and might even shorten the period of occupation for the second and third zones. In answer to a question by a German National deputy as to what compensation Germany would receive for negotiating a security pact, Stresemann emphasized the fact that it would contain an alliance with England against a French attack. He interpreted Chamberlain's attitude as a recognition of the German attitude toward revision of the eastern frontiers.³¹ On May 18 Stresemann appeared before the Reichstag to explain the government's foreign policy. He emphasized the intent of the government to avert a security agreement without Germany. Whether Germany's present initiative would lead to a

³⁰. Literary Digest, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Apr. 11, 1925) p. 17.

³¹. Stresemann, II, pp. 79-80.

peaceful understanding now depended upon the attitude of the Allies. What he wished to emphasize was the fact that there would be no settlement of the security question that included³² an additional guarantee by Germany of her eastern frontier.

The French answer to the German note of February 9,³³ was presented to Stresemann on June 16. The answer stipulated German entrance into the League of Nations as a prerequisite to the formulation of a security pact. It added that such guarantees of security as might be agreed upon ought not to imply any change in existing treaties, nor could they affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland. Though the German memorandum had not mentioned Belgium, that country would have to be included in any agreement. The Allied governments looked with favor on German willingness to conclude arbitration treaties with other states not parties to a Rhineland pact. The French government expressed a willingness to open negotiations with the object of concluding agreements looking toward additional³⁴ guarantees of peace. The French reply was followed on June 18 with the publication of Franco-British correspondence in the form of a white paper. The entire topic of security

32. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

33. Briand had by this time replaced Herriot as minister of Foreign Affairs for France.

34. World Peace Foundation, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 35-41.

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was now open for discussion.

Two days after the arrival of the French note the French ambassador visited Stresemann to obtain his reaction to the French note. Stresemann expressed his gratification over the willingness of the French government to enter into further negotiations. He had misgivings, however, over

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German entry into the League. Over the meaning of the note in its reference to arbitration treaties with the eastern states, Stresemann expressed doubt that they should be of the same scope as the treaty to be concluded with

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France. In a second meeting with Stresemann, de Margerie explained his government's understanding of the arbitration clause in question. France held that any solution of dis-

35. A few days prior to receipt of the French memorandum Stresemann noted in his diary: "This week will at last bring the answer to the Guarantee Pact, and then all along, the line it will be a case of 'decks cleared for action!' We shall discover whether the cabinet can sustain the shock or whether the Right Wing of the German Nationals will take to flight." (Stresemann, II, p. 88.)

36. The German government had made previous enquiries on their entry into the League. Special reservations would have to be made as to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League due to the disarmed conditions of Germany. In the event of international conflicts, Germany should be at liberty to determine what action to take. Germany would also have to be assured a permanent seat on the council. In answer to the German request the League replied that it could grant no special privileges. (See World Peace Foundation, Vol. 9, No. 3-4, pp. 143-154.)

37. Stresemann, II, pp. 89-91.

putes by force of arms should be excluded. De Margerie added that he had no doubt that Poland would agree to an arbitration treaty with Germany.³⁸

To Stresemann it appeared that the major disputes between Germany and the Allies over the matter of French security would come from associated questions. The first, and the one offering the greater difficulty of settlement, was the subject of arbitration treaties with Poland. He interpreted the French note to mean that France would assume the position of guarantor of the Polish frontier in much the same way that England would become the guarantor of a Rhineland agreement. The German offer, however, proposed that juridical questions should be settled by arbitration, while in political questions the nations involved should be free to accept or reject the decision. No further guarantee could be extended on the eastern frontier. The second question on which major differences of opinion would arise was the subject of German entrance into the League of Nations. On this matter Stresemann held out for special consideration under Article 16 of the League Covenant due to Germany's complete disarmament. But the note received from the League indicated that special privileges could not be granted to Germany.³⁹ In the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine Germany

38. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

39. Stresemann, II, pp. 102-106.

escaped a great danger. Stresemann felt that if a plebiscite were taken in these provinces the majority of the inhabitants would lack the courage to vote against France. If after fifty years of German occupation ninety per cent of the inhabitants declared in favor of France, Germany would suffer a severe moral defeat. Germany must hold out for evacuation for the northern zone prior to entry into the League of Nations. Questions of this type could be cleared up without too much difficulty in the negotiations for a security pact.⁴⁰

The real impediment to further negotiations came not from disagreements with France but from the German National Party, which had launched a vigorous attack against the foreign minister, even to the extent of demanding his resignation. When Chancellor Luther tried to disassociate himself from the responsibility of the German note to France on February 19 in order to appease the Nationalist Party,⁴¹ Stresemann offered to resign. The opposition of the German National Party was louder than it was real. They had too great an interest in securing the passage of a high protective grain tariff, so dear to the junkers, to resign

40. Ibid., p. 112-13.

41. Ibid., p. 121. Stresemann offered to resign and take a long sea voyage. Luther offered him the position as ambassador to England. Stresemann stated that he had no intention of resigning from political life, but would return in the fall as leader of his party. With the prospect of Stresemann in opposition to the government, Luther declined to accept the resignation.

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from the cabinet on foreign policy.

Further difficulties developed between the chancellor and the foreign minister over the answer of the French note. Luther favored a note that would satisfy all parties, while Stresemann advised a strong, clear-cut answer despite party feelings.⁴³ The note finally transmitted to Paris clearly

showed the extent to which the government tried to appease the German National Party.⁴⁴ The German reply to the French note was arranged under three headings. First, the suggestions advanced for a security pact did not ask for a modification of existing treaties, but did not exclude the possibility of adapting existing treaties to changed conditions. Such changed conditions emanating from a security agreement would definitely alter the need for occupation forces. Second, the German note challenged the right of the Allied powers to take military action against Germany, without

42. Harry J. Carman, "Germany and Austria," Current History, Vol. 22, No. 5 (August 1925) p. 825. Stresemann noted with satisfaction in his diary on July 7 the meetings of the potentates of capital--Strong, Montague Norman, and Schacht--over an additional loan to Germany contingent upon the establishment of a security pact. This was another factor that would keep the German Nationals in line. (See Stresemann, II, p. 142.)

43. D'Abernon, III, p. 175.

44. The German government made the tactical error of referring to the French note of June 16 as the note of the Allied Governments. The English point of view did not fully coincide with that of the French note. (See Glasgow, p. 87.)

previous impartial examination, whenever they felt Germany had violated treaty provisions regarding demilitarization of the Rhineland. Third, objection was raised to the proposed guarantees of the arbitration treaties. The German government raised no objection to linking the security pact with German admission into the League of Nations, but Germany's entry would be possible only if special considerations were given to her military, economic, and geographic situation. The note was concluded in somewhat more conciliatory terms by welcoming further discussion on the disputed issues.⁴⁵

Stresemann in the Reichstag defended the German note to France and the initiative Germany had thus far taken in the interests of peace. He explained again that France was intent upon assuring her security and would eventually get it, either with or without German cooperation. Without German participation there could be no peace in Europe. All that Germany had to suffer in the Rhineland was linked with France's quest for security. "France . . . feels herself threatened by Germany. We do not know in what way she is threatened. If, however, she is psychologically affected by a threat which cannot assume a practical shape, very well, let us arrange matters on both sides in such a way as to remove any apprehensions on the part of either side of a

45. World Peace Foundation, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 41-45.

declaration of war by the other." One of the great advantages for Germany, Stresemann argued, was the protection she received in the Rhineland. The foreign minister pointed out that his policy had followed a straight line from the liquidation of the Ruhr struggle to the experts' report, and now finally to the pact of security. He concluded: "Germany has now begun a peace offensive on a large scale, and it is the hope of the Government of the Reich that its efforts will be brought to a successful conclusion."⁴⁶

The debate in the Reichstag on the German note of reply ended with an approval of the foreign policy by a vote of 235 to 158.⁴⁷ A motion for a lack of confidence against the foreign minister was rejected by a large majority.

In conversation with Stresemann, D'Abernon took an optimistic view of the prospects that a security pact might come into force. Stresemann expressed doubt. For Germany there were four major points that needed settlement:

(1) The question of entry into the League; (2) The question of the courts of arbitration; (3) The question of the position of France as guarantor; and (4) The question of the effect of the security pact on the occupation of the Rhineland and the

46. Gustav Stresemann, Essays and Speeches on Various Subjects, Translated by Christopher R. Turner. (London: 1950) pp. 222-231. Hereafter cited, Essays and Speeches.

47. Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 42.

periods for which occupation was to last. The English ambassador felt that these were issues that could be settled in a conference of ministers. He inquired what Stresemann's attitude would be to such a meeting. Stresemann expressed a willingness to attend such a conference if the chancellor might also be present. His presence would be necessary to⁴⁸ allay the suspicions of the extreme right.

The French reply to the German note of July 20 was⁴⁹ handed to Stresemann by the French ambassador on August 24. The French note, in more tactful and less offensive language than the previous German note, confined itself to answering the three major questions raised by the German government. Existing treaties could not be impaired; the evacuation of the Rhineland could, therefore, be no part of the pact. No special conditions could be made to German entry into the League. Having once joined the League Germany could then submit her wishes to the council. The proposed arbitration treaties should apply to juridical and political disputes.

48. Stresemann, II, pp. 151. In his diary D'Abernon noted that the time had come for a meeting of foreign ministers, and to stop writing notes. German notes always made a bad impression. The last note was such as to make a French reply indispensable. (See D'Abernon, III, p. 182.)

49. Following receipt of the German note of July 20, Briand and Chamberlain met in London to agree on the French reply. Glasgow, pp. 94-95.

equally. The note concluded by inviting the German govern-
ment to enter into negotiations on this basis.⁵⁰ The French,
British, and Belgian ambassadors in Berlin accompanied the
note with a verbal invitation to German legal experts to
meet with experts of the above mentioned powers to begin
work on the legal and technical questions involved in a
security pact. On completion of the work by the jurists,
the foreign ministers of the interested powers should then
meet for a final agreement. On September 15 the French
ambassador handed Stresemann the memorandum on a conference
of ministers to take place at the end of September or early
October. No place for the conference was designated, but
it was suggested the meeting be held in some neutral terri-
tory.⁵¹

Following the invitation, the German National Party
intrigued to wreck the security pact, and so make Strese-
mann's position as a strong political figure untenable.
Schiela, the Minister of Interior, and acting as spokesman for
the Nationalist party, suggested an impossible program that
included all the present world problems for the German
delegates to put forward at the convention. He then indorsed
Stresemann as the logical delegate to represent Germany.

50. World Peace Foundation, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 45-49.

51. Ibid., p. 50

The intent was to load the foreign minister with so many demands that the conference was doomed to failure. The purpose was to eliminate Stresemann from the government and still retain Luther as chancellor. The plot failed when Luther expressed his intention to take the consequences of the conference.⁵² The German cabinet, on September 23, officially accepted the invitation and appointed Luther and Stresemann as German delegates.⁵³

In his diary Stresemann listed the various points that he would put forward at the forthcoming meeting.

1. There must be definite assurance that the existing system of occupation will be altered.
2. An effort must be made to set aside the preamble to the London draft.
3. Germany will insist on general disarmament.
4. A change in the form of military control must be advanced.
5. An effort must be made to reduce the period of occupation for the second and third zones.
6. A guarantee of the eastern frontiers will be refused.

52. Stresemann, II, pp. 164-5.

53. The Nationalists insisted on another minister to accompany the delegates, primarily to keep check on Stresemann because the foreign minister came to decisions too hastily. Schubert, the Secretary of State, was selected as a safe man, but even he would not be enough of a check since his vocabulary was limited to Es ist schrecklich! (See D'Abernon, III, p. 188.

Stresemann gained support from an unexpected source when Gessler, the minister of defense, a prominent Nationalist, answered the charge of renouncing Alsace-Lorraine. "Renunciation? You can't call it renunciation when a one-legged man is asked to promise that he won't take part in any more dancing competition." Vallentin, p. 207.

7. Germany must be granted a special interpretation of Article 16 prior to entry into the League.⁵⁴

At this stage of the negotiations the German government, again in the interests of retaining support of the German Nationalist party, issued a statement on the war guilt lie. The Nationalists feared that the signing of the proposed security pact would in effect be another signing of the Treaty of Versailles.⁵⁵

54. Ibid., pp. 165-167.

55. (Glasgow, pp. 117-122.) For a time it appeared as if the German declaration endangered the forthcoming conference. The Allied governments replied that the question of war guilt was not associated with a security pact. On leaving for the conference Chamberlain made the remark, "Wish me well, but don't expect too much."

D'Abernon noted in his diary that the war guilt question was raised because it was the only way the government could get the assent of the parties to attend the conference. Pressure was also exerted by President von Hindenburg for the publication of a memorandum on German war guilt. (D'Abernon, III, pp. 190-1.)

CHAPTER VI

THE LOCARNO CONFERENCE

Prior to leaving for the conference at Locarno Stresemann wrote to the former crown prince, explaining the real objectives of German foreign policy as it related to entry into the League of Nations and the security pact. He wrote:

On the question of Germany's entry into the League I would make the following observations:

In my opinion there are three great tasks that confront German foreign policy in the more immediate future. In the first place the solution of the reparations question in a sense tolerable for Germany, and the assurance of peace, which is an essential promise for the recovery of our strength. Secondly, the protection of Germans abroad, those ten to twelve millions of our kindred who now live under a foreign yoke in foreign lands. The third great task is the readjustment of our eastern frontiers: the recovery of Danzig, the Polish corridor, and a correction of the frontier in Upper Silesia. In the background stands the union with German Austria, although I am quite clear that this not merely brings no advantages to Germany, but seriously complicates the problem of the German Reich. If we want to secure these aims, we must concentrate on these tasks. Hence the Security Pact, which guarantees us peace, and constitutes England, as well as Italy, if Mussolini consents to collaborate, as guarantors of our western frontiers.

He continued his letter by acknowledging the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as only theoretic, since there was no possible chance for recovery of the provinces. As a member of the League Germany could assume the role of protector for the German minorities not within the Reich. With a seat on the League Council Germany would be able to protect her interests. The first move necessary for Germany was to rid

herself of the occupation force. "We must get the strangle hold off our neck. On that account, German policy, as Metternich said to Austria, no doubt after 1809, will be one of finesse and the avoidance of great decisions."¹

Stresemann's objectives were clear, and the stakes were high. A major step toward fulfilling his goals was the establishment of the proposed security pact. The negotiations would have to be conducted in such a manner that Germany's freedom of action in the future should not be compromised and in such a manner that acceptance of the pact, once completed, would not be endangered by the German Nationalist Party.

The conference at Locarno convened on October 5, with Luther and Stresemann present for Germany, Vandervelde for Belgium, Briand for France, and Chamberlain for Great Britain. Chamberlain was selected to open the meeting, and acted unofficially throughout the conference as chairman.² The proceedings of the conference were confidential with an official communique being issued daily.³

Many of the controversial issues were passed over

1. Stresemann, II, pp. 503-5.

2. On the opening of the meeting the German motion that the chairmanship should rotate was rejected. Luther considered this most important for creating a good impression in Germany. (See Stresemann, II, p. 172.)

3. Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 49.

rapidly due to the preliminary work of the legal experts. The conference devoted itself to the major task of finding agreements on German entry into the League of Nations; the relation of the arbitration treaties of the east with the security pact for the west; French guarantee of the eastern treaties; and finally the question of evacuation of the Cologne zone.

The general spirit of good will and the determination to secure results that prevailed at Locarno contributed greatly to a solution of the issues in dispute. In the first interview between Briand and Luther, the French foreign minister voiced this spirit: "I am a Frenchman, you are a German, and as such we are antagonists. But can't I remain a good Frenchman, and be a good European at the same time? And can't you do your duty as a German, while thinking at the same time of the prior claim of Europe?" Can't we reach an understanding on this ground?"⁴ The ministers of the various countries had staked their governments on the success of Locarno. They had to come to some accord.

The opening session of October 6 developed into a debate between Stresemann and Briand on the eastern European question. Briand broached the subject by stating that France was honor bound by previous commitments to Poland.

4. Stern-Rubarth, p. 86

The guarantee that France requested on the eastern question, over and above the security assured under Article 16 of the League Covenant, referred only to cases unlikely to occur. Stresemann maintained that the arbitration treaties Germany was willing to grant to the eastern countries, coupled with Germany's entrance into the League, would give France two assurances of peace in the east. The Third guarantee was unnecessary. In expressing the English point of view, Chamberlain said England could not pledge herself to any guarantees for eastern Europe, whereas if war broke out between France and Germany, she would surely come to the aid of the power attacked. However, he supported Briand in the contention that Article 16 was an indefinite⁵ guarantee that involved only a moral obligation.

The October 8 meeting confined itself primarily to the discussion of Germany's entry into the League of Nations. As had been foreshadowed by the exchange of notes, and the memorandum to the League, Germany requested a special interpretation of Article 16 in respect of her disarmed condition. In upholding the German point of view Stresemann argued that a situation might arise where Germany had to apply economic sanctions, for example against Russia. This act, in turn, could lead to war. Germany

5. Stresemann, II, pp. 173-5.

would be in no position to contribute military aid, and to allow the transit of troops through her territory would then involve her. In that event, Briand maintained, Germany should stand aside for foreign troops. Luther and Stresemann both objected to Briand's suggestion. Stresemann argued further that Germany had no desire to take refuge in moral isolation. If Germany did not prevent unanimity in the Council of the League, she would stand by the League with all her moral authority. The militarism of the Allies and the helplessness of Germany was undesirable. The Allies had created a situation in which they would be demanding help from Germany that she could not provide.⁶ From Article 16, Stresemann shifted the discussion to the question of war guilt. Germany, he said, recognized her international obligations, but could never recognize the moral responsibility for the war. The present government supported the recently issued memorandum. The mention of "war guilt" was followed by a nervous tension that threatened the gathering. The situation was smoothed over by Chamberlain.

6. Ibid., II, pp. 176-8. In an interview with Stern-Rubarth, Briand said, "A remarkable man, that Dr. Stresemann-- a very remarkable man! He fights tooth and nail for his country, but I am sure he is quite sincere when he explains that he is working for Europe in doing so. We can both be good patriots, can't we, and at the same time bear in mind that Europe is our common heritage, and in danger of destruction if we don't bury the hatchet?" (See Stern-Rubarth, p. 89.)

Briand shifted the topic to colonies. He said no one could dispute Germany's moral right to colonies. Briand's suggestion was followed by silence on the part of Chamberlain. Stresemann noted in his diary that Chamberlain was perfectly willing to give up French colonies while Briand was willing to give up English colonies.⁷

During a boat trip on Lago Maggiore a general compromise was reached on interpretation of Article 16 of the League Covenant. It was agreed that a draft collective note should be addressed by the powers to Germany, stating that in their interpretation of Article 16 each member state of the League was bound to cooperate with the Covenant of the League to the extent which is compatible with its military situation and its geographical position.⁸ In answer to a contention by Stresemann for the need of general disarmament, Briand answered that general disarmament was not the practical aim of the League of Nations. In the present organization of the League the larger nations assumed the major burden of defense for the less powerful states. Luther objected that this was an impossible principle, and expected the League at a later date to introduce general disarmament.⁹

7. Stresemann, II, pp. 181-2

8. Ibid., p. 182.

9. Ibid., pp. 178-9.

During a private conversation with Chamberlain, Stresemann outlined the general demands of Germany as corollaries of the Rhineland pact. He expected a general alteration of the Rhineland regime that resulted in the reduction of the periods of occupation, the reduction of occupying forces, the withdrawal of the black troops, the abolition of penalties for contumacy, the release of the prisoners from the Ruhr district, suspension of the investigation protocol and evacuation of the Cologne zone. Germany expected an increase of her police force and the permission to house them in barracks. This was a positive need in face of communist threats in Germany. Germany requested, also, a free hand in training troops, and the maintenance of the High Command in the Reichswehr. If the occupation were withdrawn, Stresemann recommended an earlier plebiscite¹⁰ for the Saar. Briand on being informed of the German demands said that if these views were accepted the Treaty of Versailles might as well cease to exist.¹¹ In general, he had no objections to the German demands, but it was impossible

10. Ibid., p. 179-80.

11. Stresemann records in his diary that Briand almost fell off the sofa when he heard the German demands. This time the Germans had gone too far, he remarked. (Ibid., p. 180.) In reference to the constant demands advanced by Germany, Chamberlain said to Stresemann, "Whenever we make a concession to you, instead of acknowledging it you ask for more." Briand interjected, "By no means a bad system." (See D'Abernon, III, p. 240.)

to grant them all at once. He, also, was faced with enemies in France, and noted that all the unreasonable persons were not a monopoly of Germany. In private conversation with Luther, Briand again assured him that he had no objections to the German requests, but these were problems to settle in another conference. Chamberlain informed Stresemann that he did not object to the evacuation of the Cologne zone. On this assurance, Stresemann was willing not to tie the idea of evacuation into the negotiations of Locarno.¹²

On October 15 Chamberlain announced that the negotiations had been completed, and that the initialing of the treaties would take place on the following day.¹³ At the time of Chamberlain's announcement, the Polish question was still unsettled. During a night session on the 15th a general agreement was reached. In addition to the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia, France concluded separate treaties between the two states agreeing that in the event the Council of the League failed to reach a unanimous decision, France would come to the immediate aid of either power should it be

¹². Stresemann, II, p. 180.

¹³. Chamberlain confessed to Stern-Rubarth, "I'll tell you a secret: tomorrow is my birthday. I have never yet had a birthday present like this, and I must get it at any price!" Stern-Rubarth, p. 94.

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subjected to an unprovoked attack.

At the formal initialing of the treaties Stresemann, in a speech at the final ceremony, regarded the Treaty of Locarno as a new development in the history of the relations among states. The real significance of Locarno was that it was not the end but the beginning of confident cooperation
15
of nations.

The Locarno agreements consisted of:

1. A final protocol with six annexes

Annex A. Treaty of mutual guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

Annex B. Arbitration convention between Germany and Belgium.

Annex C. Arbitration convention between Germany and France.

Annex D. Arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland.

Annex E. Arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Annex F. Draft collective note to Germany regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

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2. Treaty between France and Czechoslovakia.

14. Toynbee, 1925, II, p. 52

15. Stresemann, II, pp. 188-9.

16. "The Locarno Agreements and the League of Nations," Monthly Summary of the League of Nations Supplement, (September 1925) pp. 1-20; Mowat, pp. 310-24.

In the preamble to the final protocol the representatives of Germany, Belgium, England, France, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia approved and initialed in variatur the annexes "A" through "E". The representatives of the German government expressed their conviction that the treaties would contribute greatly to the peace and security of Europe¹⁷ and hasten general disarmament.

In the treaty of mutual assistance the contracting parties guaranteed the existing frontier between Germany and France, and the demilitarized zone as specified by Articles 42 and 43.¹⁸ of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany and Belgium and Germany and France agreed not to resort to war against each other except in case of: legitimate defense as a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles; action under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and action in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7¹⁹ of the Covenant. They agreed to settle

17. "The Locarno Agreements and the League of Nations," p. 2.

18. Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortification either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Article 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works of mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

19. Paragraph 7 provides: If the Council fails to agree, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right of action.

disputes between them through conciliation. In case of flagrant violations the contracting parties would come to the help of the injured party. The treaty would be registered with the League of Nations, and enter into force as soon as Germany has become a member of the League.²⁰

The arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France agreed to submit, to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, all disputes which they failed to settle by ordinary diplomacy.²¹ The arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia conformed to Annexes B and C with few minor changes in the preamble.²²

Under Annex F the signatory powers declared that they were in no position to speak for the League of Nations, but were willing to give their collective interpretation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League. They understood this article to mean that "each state member of the League is bound to cooperate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation

20. "The Locarno Agreements, and the League of Nations," loc. cit., pp. 3-5.

21. Ibid., pp. 5-12.

22. Ibid., pp. 12-18.

and takes its geographical position into account."²³

The final treaties between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia reciprocally agreed, acting in application to Article 18 of the League Covenant, to give each other immediate aid in case of an unprovoked recourse to arms.²⁴

Prior to leaving Locarno, Stresemann grasped Briand's hand and expressed his gratitude to the French statesman. Briand replied, "No, don't speak of words. I shall prove to you that they are not merely words, but deeds."²⁵

23. Ibid., p. 19.

24. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

25. Stresemann, II, p. 188.

CHAPTER VII

ACCEPTANCE OF THE LOCARNO PACT

The general reception by the European press and the public was favorable to the Locarno Pact. Editors and correspondents predicted that the term "allied powers" would drop out of public usage, and many of the reporters spoke of themselves as citizens of Europe. The press was quick to note the resumption of football matches between British and German teams. The war spirit was being replaced by a new spirit--the spirit of Locarno.¹ The German delegates on their return to Berlin were greeted by a deputation of the cabinet and foreign ambassadors. D'Abernon greeted Luther and Stresemann with a congratulatory message from Chamberlain.²

The first signs of real opposition in Germany to the Locarno Pact made themselves apparent in a cabinet meeting on October 19. The cabinet came to a general agreement to accept the texts as initialed. Dr. Schiele, minister of interior, abstained from voting, and on the instructions from his party, the German National group, with two other

1. Literary Digest, Vol. 87, No. 9 (November 28, 1925) p. 11.

2. Stresemann, II, p. 191.

members of the same party, withdrew from the Government.³

The break-up of the cabinet meeting was the signal for the German National party to open a bitter assault on the Locarno Pact in general and on the foreign minister in particular. Count Westarp, prominent leader of the party, issued a resolution adopted by the German National party. The group declared that the Locarno negotiations failed to take into account the vital needs of the German people; that none of the other powers made sacrifices equivalent to those of Germany; that the party could never agree to any treaty that acknowledged a renunciation of German soil and population.⁴ The Hugenberg press, representing the extreme Nationalist group, criticized the pact as being, not a treaty of peace, but a means for further subjugation of Germany to the Allies. The Deutsche Tagesblatt referred to the pact as the "disgrace of Locarno" and the "Third Versailles." The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung regarded the defense treaties of France with Poland and Czechoslovakia as military alliances against Germany. Now, the press argued, could a completely disarmed state like Germany attack a militaristic state like Poland. It could not be a treaty

³ Harry J. Garmen, "Reactions to Locarno Pact in Germany," Current History, Vol. 23 (December 1925) p. 426. President Hindenburg, though personally opposed to the pact particularly as touching the League of Nations, reprimanded the German National Party for their action as a "gross breach of discipline." (See Stresemann, II, p. 192.)

⁴ Ibid., p. 193.

of defense because where there was no aggressor there could be no defender. The press took notice of the enthusiasm expressed for the Locarno pact in Paris and London. Elation⁵ by the enemies was a bad sign.

Not content with attacking the pact, the Nationalist press was equally hostile toward persons connected with the negotiations. Stresemann was called a traitor who surrendered Alsace-Lorraine to France of his own free will. Further insults were hurled against the foreign minister and his family: Stresemann in the pay of France; bought and bribed by the Jews--the wise men of Zion; Frau Stresemann, the sister of Madame Poincare.⁶ Wagner, deputy of the Bavarian Landtag, declared he could easily understand any exile from Alsace-Lorraine wanting to shoot Stresemann.⁷ Not even Hindenburg was neglected. Ludendorff published a letter in which he recalled the day when he had divided honor and glory with the great general. Now Hindenburg's name, should he sign this treaty of enslavement,⁸ would go down in shame.

Stresemann busied himself with answering accusations

5. Literary Digest, Vol. 87, No. 10 (Dec. 4, 1925) p. 19.

6. Vallentin, pp. 203-4.

7. Stresemann, II, p. 300.

8. Harry J. Carman, "German Reactions to Locarno Pact Defeated," Current History, Vol. 23 (January 1926) p. 585.

against himself, defending the Locarno agreements, and arousing public sentiment in favor of the pact. A visit to the home of Stresemann by MacDonald, former Labor Prime Minister of England, increased the foreign minister's prestige among the Social Democratic group.⁹ Stresemann sent advice to Dr. Jänecke on matters the latter should stress at a meeting of business men in Hanover. He urged emphasis of the fact that Mr. Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank, said that America was greatly impressed by the German initiative towards a European peace. If the peace movement should now be blocked in Germany the reaction in the United States would be such that the Americans would refuse to subscribe to German bonds.¹⁰

In a broadcast address on November 3, Stresemann appealed to the German public for endorsement of the Locarno treaty. He reminded the German people that France in 1919 had hoped to solve her security problem by the disintegration of Germany. Poincare had the same objective in mind in 1923. Germany had to reckon with the attitude of other powers as well. Unless Germany took the initiative, England would eventually solve the security problem in conjunction with France to the detriment of the Reich. In

⁹. Carman, "Reactions to Locarno Pact in Germany" op. cit., p. 426.

¹⁰. Stresemann, II, p. 206.

explaining the contents of the Locarno Pact, Stresemann emphasized that the decision not to resort to war on the western frontier was binding on France and Belgium as well as Germany. He reminded the public that Marshal Foch had asked for the Rhine as France's frontier. With England as guarantor of the pact, Bismarck's concept of peace for Europe was fulfilled. Germany had regained her freedom in the Rhineland. The arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia provided a basis for the settlement of disputes, but could in no way be construed as a recognition of the eastern frontier. The special treaties that France made with these nations gave France no more right than she already had under the League of Nations. According to the interpretation of Article 16, Germany on entering the League, could not be compelled to take part in a war against her will, nor would she have to grant passage of troops through her territory. The Locarno Pact was more than a security agreement; it was rather a means toward European peace. The elation of Versailles was a thing of the past. 11

On several different occasions Stresemann discussed the opposition of the German National party with the English ambassador. What was needed, Stresemann pointed out, were some signs of alleviation of the Allied policy in the

Rhineland. A definite statement should be issued regarding the date for the evacuation of the Rhineland. Should some definite announcement come from the Allies, it would greatly affect the decision of the Reichstag when the Locarno treaties were presented for approval. D'Abernon expressed his approval of Stresemann's request, and agreed to notify his government of the situation. The ambassador mentioned¹² that the evacuation would likely begin on December 1.

On November 16 the Ambassador's Conference notified the German ambassador in Paris of the modification to take place in the Rhineland. The note informed the German government that the evacuation of the Cologne zone was to begin on¹³ December 1 and be concluded on January 31. The news of the evacuation failed to produce the desired effect that the government had hoped. The extreme right refused to admit¹⁴ that any good could come from the present policy.

As the date for the opening of the Reichstag approached, signs encouraging to the government became apparent throughout the Reich. The Social Democratic party assured the

¹² Stresemann, II, pp. 207-8. The actual influence of D'Abernon in bringing about the announcement of the date for the evacuation of the Cologne zone cannot be determined. It can, however, be assumed that he kept his government well informed on political trends in Germany.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

¹⁴ D'Abernon, III, p. 208.

chancellor of their support for the pact. Three hundred leading industrialists, including prominent Nationalists, issued a manifesto on the contribution of the Locarno treaties to the revival of German economic life. The signers of the manifesto included bankers of Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Cologne; the Ruhr coal and steel magnates; and the chemical and dye interests.¹⁵

With the opening of the Reichstag on November 20 the final fight for the Locarno pact began. Luther opened the debate for the defense, with Communist and Nationalist deputies hissing loudly.¹⁶ Count Westarp rejected the decisions on behalf of his group. Stresemann answered the Count's charges by appealing to the deputies to end the policy of dictate and oppression, and to advance a program that would lead to the "recovery of German sovereignty, and therewith the recovery of a basis on which we may later on reconstruct German life and German freedom." In a final vote the Reichstag endorsed the Locarno pact by a vote of 292-174; the German Nationals voting solidly in opposition.¹⁷

15. Carman, *German Reactions to Locarno Pact, Defeated*, op. cit., p. 586.

16. Ibid.

17. Stresemann, II, pp. 229-31. In his diary, Stresemann recorded: "We should perhaps have won over a majority of the German Nationals to our side had a two-thirds majority been necessary for the acceptance of the proposal. But as it was determined that a simple majority sufficed, the German Nationals registered a compact No, and saved their party soul." (Ibid., p. 233.)

The formal signing of the Locarno Pact took place in London on December 1. All countries party to the agreement were represented. Prime Minister Baldwin and Foreign Minister Chamberlain were on hand for England. Briand, holding the position of premier and foreign minister, represented France. From Germany came Chancellor Luther and Foreign Minister Stresemann.¹⁸ Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia sent Vandervelde, Count Skrynniki, and Dr. Benes. Considering it inexpedient for himself to be present,¹⁹ Mussolini delegated Count Sialoja to sign for Italy.²⁰ Each of the delegates spoke briefly during the ceremony.

18. In a speech delivered at Gross-Berlin, following the formal signing at London, Stresemann spoke of the reception given to the German delegates at London and the effect this reception had on some circles in France. He emphasized the fact that the only person in London who spoke in behalf of the guests was the German chancellor, and that the first deputations received by the king were the German delegates. In criticism of this procedure the Action Francaise commented, "The King of England would do well, before receiving war criminals and Boches, to change his name again to what it once was: Koburg-Gotha." To which Stresemann added, "You see, there are plenty of people in France who will have none of Locarno." Stresemann, II, p. 224.

19. The Outlook, "Launching the Locarno Pact," Vol. 141, No. 15 (December 9, 1925) pp. 547-8.

20. A violent argument arose between Luther and Stresemann on the contents of the chancellor's reply to the welcoming messages of the king and Chamberlain. Stresemann suggested he speak of the spirit of Locarno, while Luther was determined to speak of the occupation of the Rhineland. The two statesmen finally compromised. Instead of the spirit of Locarno the phrase "united will of the signatory powers" was used, and the expression to the "Rhineland" was made only in a general form. (Stresemann, II, pp. 234-5.

Following the signing, Briand and Stresemann addressed the meeting.

In his concluding remarks Stresemann referred to the "European Idea." This Europe, through its suffering in the last great war, stood in danger of losing the position to which it was entitled by tradition. The war did teach the Europeans, however, their inter-dependence. Either they advance or go down together. He concluded: "It is to close the seven years that followed the war, by a time of real peace, upheld by the will of responsible and farseeing statesmen, who have shown us the way to such development, and will be supported by their peoples, who know that only in this fashion can prosperity increase. May later generations have cause to bless this day as the beginning of a new era."

21. Ibid., II, pp. 238-40.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRAIGHT LINE OF REAL POLITIK

The straight line of Stresemann's policy, starting with the Ruhr struggle in 1923 and carrying through the signing of the Locarno pact in London on December 1, 1925, continued unswerving until his death in 1929. Before Stresemann lay German entry into the League of Nations, the failure of Thoiry, the withdrawal of the Allied military control commission, the signing of the Kellogg Pact in 1928, and finally the revision of the Dawes Plan. Though he died before he could reap the full reward of his policy of rapprochement with the west, he knew that the complete liberation of the Rhineland had been achieved five years before the time set by the Treaty of Versailles.

The emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes emanating from the Locarno Pact remained as the fundamental basis of future negotiations. His work in making Locarno a reality won for him the Nobel Peace prize for the year 1926. In his address at Oslo, on accepting the peace award, Stresemann spoke of the policy of the "new Germany." The old Germany collapsed at the end of the war; the new Germany was in a state of transformation. The peace award which he had received expressed the national longing of the new Germany for international cooperation. In the

will for peace and understanding the majority of the German people were united.¹ The man who had dreamed of dictating a peace providing for the enlargement of imperial Germany--now spoke of international cooperation.

The straight line of foreign policy won for Stresemann a position of respect enjoyed by few German statesmen. Maximilian Harden, correspondent for the Neue Freie Press described Stresemann's position in the German Reichstag.

He stands alone because the 'ceroule' around him has formed at a respectful distance. Now and then a favored acquaintance disengages himself timidly from the crowd, advances with a deep obeisance, shakes the great man's hand, exchanges a couple of reverential words with him and then withdraws backward, wriggling his rump with fawning rapture.²

In an analysis of Stresemann's achievements, D'Abernon compared him favorably with Bismarck and Bulow.³ What these two statesmen had accomplished with the backing of military force and prestige, Stresemann duplicated through peaceful negotiation, backed by a dispirited and defeated nation.

Was the straight line really directed toward the pacification of Europe, or was it merely a means toward the fulfilment of a policy Stresemann outlined in his letter to

1. Stresemann, III, pp. 493-507.

2. Maximilian Harden, "Herr Doctor Stresemann," Living Age, (reprinted from the Neue Freie Press, Vienna daily), Vol. 333, (August 1, 1927) p. 219.

3. D'Abernon, "Stresemann," op. cit., p. 210.

the Crown Prince?⁴ At Magdeburg he had demanded: "Give me power! But if I have not the power I must take what I need to achieve freedom."⁵

A brief review of Stresemann's attitude toward the disarmament of Germany and toward the eastern frontier may reveal the real intent behind his search for rapprochement with the west.

To the note from Chequers, England, insisting upon an investigation of Germany by the military control commission,⁶ Stresemann was quick to reply that to all intents and purposes Germany was disarmed. Such minor discrepancies as the commission found might easily be remedied. At the Locarno conference, however, he asked for an increase of the police force, and that the force be permitted to be housed in barracks; he asked, also, for a High Command of the Reichswehr,⁷ and that it be given a free hand in training troops. Despite the insistence by Stresemann that Germany was disarmed, the Reichswehr maintained close relations with the Stahlhelm and other patriotic associations which might be used as reserves should the situation demand it. The

4. See above, pp. 76-7; see also p. 62.

5. See above, p. 45.

6. See above, pp. 49-50.

7. See above, p. 92.

generals, though not war-like at the time, worked to improve and strengthen the Reichswehr.⁸ During the prosecution of Nazi war criminals evidence was produced to show that at the time Hitler came to power "he found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional officers with morale and outlook nourished by German military history."⁹ Ambassador Dodd states that, during his stay in Germany from 1933 to 1938, he had evidence that Germany had been secretly arming as early as 1920. He stated that Stresemann, though claiming to be sincerely cooperative with England and France, granted¹⁰ secret funds to further rearmament.

About his attitude toward the eastern frontier, Stresemann had no secrets. On various occasions he expressed himself clearly that these frontiers were unacceptable

8. Rosenberg, p. 268.

9. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression," Vol. II, 1941, p. 318.

Von Blomberg, former Field Marshall and Commander in Chief of the German armed forces until 1938 signed the following affidavit: From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the question of the Polish Corridor, Ruhr, and Memel. I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms . . . This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power." Ibid., II, p. 335.

10. William Dodd, Ambassador Dodd's Diary, (New York: 1941) p. 306.

to Germany and would some day have to be revised. While negotiations for a security pact were under way, Stresemann in a letter to von Maltzan, ambassador to the United States, boasted that German policy regarding security had succeeded by splitting the Entente and opening new prospects in the east.¹¹ The method by which the eastern frontier was to be revised is not revealed in Stresemann's diaries and letters, but the hope was expressed that it could be accomplished by peaceful means. Stresemann's certainty over the eventual change of the Polish frontier by peaceful means is also noticed by his biographer, Vallentin. Vallentin records Stresemann's answer to the problem of Poland's outlet to the sea, should the Corridor be granted to Germany. To this question Stresemann answered, "We can let the experts puzzle their heads over that later on; when we get as far as that, many a political constellation may have changed. But first we must get so far."¹² Dr. Pisk records Stresemann, after a meeting with Pilsudski, as saying: "It is impossible to get rid of the Corridor by means of war. We must therefore examine whether we can regain it in a peaceful way . . . A solution is only thinkable by a continuation of the policy of Locarno, that is, by close relations between Berlin,

11. Stresemann, II, p. 263.

12. Vallentin, pp. 243-4.

13

London, and Paris."

His policy of rapprochement seems thus clearly to have been dictated by other considerations than just the search for peace in Europe. First, it was necessary for any government in Germany, if it hoped to remain in power, to work for improvements in the west. Second, as Germany's relations with the western powers improved her chances for success in an eastern policy increased. Real Politik meant proceeding step by step consolidating gains as they were won, taking a German advantage in every occasion that could be exploited. His policy was avowedly one of political opportunism.

Stresemann's life was devoted to the settlement in the west. It was left to other German leaders to find a solution for the eastern frontier.

15. Dr. F. W. Pick, "Stresemann," Contemporary Review, Vol. 156, (Oct. 1939) pp. 453.

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